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411 
Equity over Equality: Equal 




 In 2018, a Texas District Court shocked the nation by 
declaring the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional 
pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
The decision was overturned by the Fifth Circuit but may well be 
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ICWA provides a 
framework for the removal and placement of Indian children 
into foster and adoptive homes in such a way that attempts to 
reflect the unique values of Indian culture and supports the 
autonomy of the tribe. In doing so, the law treats Indian children 
differently than it would White children. But does this divergent 
treatment constitute impermissible racial discrimination? 
Should the ICWA’s protections be applied to children merely 
eligible for tribal membership? What level of scrutiny should 
courts use when analyzing the ICWA’s constitutionality? This 
Note will provide insight into these questions which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed. 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. My deepest gratitude to Professor Joan Shaughnessy for her superb 
edits, patient conversations, and knack for asking questions that forced me to 
rethink everything. Special thanks also to Professor Sheryl Buske for 
introducing me to this topic and teaching me so much. Thank you to the 
Washington and Lee Law Review for their thoughtful guidance and to my 
family for their endless encouragement. Finally, thank you to Chandler—in 
this, as in all things, I am eternally grateful for your love and support. 
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 This Note provides a background of the ICWA and examines 
the current constitutional controversy in the Fifth Circuit by 
placing the ICWA in the larger statutory context of federal 
Indian jurisprudence. This Note analyzes the fundamental 
question raised in Indian law equal protection cases—whether 
the term “Indian” should be interpreted as a racial or political 
classification. An examination of precedent confirms the unique 
status of Indians as non-racial, semi-autonomous actors who 
often receive uncommon treatment. With this context in mind, 
this Note explores past equal protection challenges to the ICWA 
and lays out the current case. This Note recommends that the 
Supreme Court uphold the Fifth Circuit’s finding of 
constitutionality on the equal protection claim and provides two 
possible analytical paths to reach that conclusion. The first 
ascribes to the common argument that “Indian” should be viewed 
as a political classification, subject to reduced scrutiny. The 
second, however, questions the assumption that the application 
of strict scrutiny is fatal to the ICWA, instead proposing an 
alternative path forward drawing from Supreme Court 
reasoning in affirmative action cases. This Note concludes that 
future challenges to the ICWA should be struck down as the 
ICWA passes all levels of constitutional scrutiny.  
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I.  Introduction 
Since its origin, the Indian Child Welfare Act1 (ICWA) has 
faced numerous constitutional challenges for its bold policy of 
treating Indian2 children differently than non-Indian children 
in child custody proceedings.3 Underlying and justifying this 
differentiated treatment is a deep-seated history of 
discrimination faced by Indian families from welfare agencies 
and state court systems.4 Described by some lawmakers as a 
“cultural genocide,”5 by the 1970s “a minimum of 25 percent of 
all Indian children [were] either in foster homes, adoptive 
homes, and/or boarding schools” instead of living with their 
parents.6 The United States Congress responded by drafting the 
ICWA, a complex federal statutory framework for the removal 
and placement of Indian children into foster and adoptive homes 
that attempted to “reflect the unique values of Indian culture” 
and “[provided] for assistance to Indian tribes.”7 The ICWA’s 
framework immediately sparked accusations of equal protection 
 
 1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. 
 2. This Note will use the term “Indian” rather than “Native American” 
or “Alaskan Native” in order to be consistent with the statutory language of 
the ICWA. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) also uses the political term 
“Indian” in its current recognition of 573 Indian tribes. See Indian Entities 
Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1200, 1200 (Feb. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Indian 
Entities]. As this Note argues, the term “Indian” is political, not racial, and 
thus it is especially crucial to use the designated term for the political 
category. 
 3. See Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, Racial Anxieties in Adoption: 
Reflections on Adoptive Couple, White Parenthood, and Constitutional 
Challenges to the ICWA, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727, 727 (describing the ICWA 
as “under fire” as challengers argue that it “interferes with adoptions and 
violates the Constitution by doing so”). 
 4. See Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Indian Affair, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings] (“It 
appears that for decades Indian parents and their children have been at the 
mercy of arbitrary or abusive action of local, State, Federal, and private agency 
officials.”) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk). 
 5. Id. at 2. 
 6. Id. at 1. 
 7. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
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violations. Even today, the ICWA, with its underlying purpose 
of acknowledging important differences between Indian and 
non-Indian children,8 challenges courts to address the 
fundamental question of whether to prioritize equity of 
semi-autonomous Indian tribes and their children over legal 
equality. 
In perhaps the most significant challenge to date, a Texas 
federal district court struck down the ICWA as unconstitutional 
in 2018.9 The reaction nationwide was one of outrage.10 The case 
was appealed and a three-judge panel of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, affirming the 
ICWA’s constitutionality under the Equal Protection Clause.11 
Shortly after the decision came out, however, the Fifth Circuit 
voted to rehear the case en banc.12 Oral arguments in January 
2020 garnered national attention in both the Indian and legal 
community for the potential implications not only on the ICWA, 
but on the constitutionality of all federal Indian law.13 
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit produced a deeply divided opinion, 
with a slim majority affirming the constitutionality of certain 
ICWA provisions under the Equal Protection Clause, but 
remaining equally divided on the constitutionality of others.14 
 
 8. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 8 (1978), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7530 [hereinafter House Report] (“[ICWA’s purpose is] to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum Federal 
standards for the removal [and placement] of Indian children . . . which will 
reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .”). 
 9. Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 543–44 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 10. See, e.g., Official Statement: Joint Statement on Indian Child Welfare 
Case Brackeen v. Zinke Ruling, NAT’L CONG. INDIAN AM. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://
perma.cc/QYB4-8K9J (“This egregious decision ignores the direct federal 
government-to-government relationship and decades upon decades of 
precedent that have upheld tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indian 
children and families.”). 
 11. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 425–30 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 12. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 13. See Leah Litman & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Necessity of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act, ATLANTIC (Jan. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z2XG-
N56U (“In Brackeen, Texas has mounted nothing less than a frontal attack on 
the entire corpus of federal law that governs Indian affairs today.”). 
 14.  Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at 
*7–8 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (“The district court’s ruling that provisions of 
ICWA and the Final Rule are unconstitutional because they incorporate the 
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This convoluted ruling will likely be appealed to the Supreme 
Court.15 This Note will endeavor to address whether the ICWA 
is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.16 
This Note will proceed as follows: Part II will bring into 
focus the historical and political landscape behind the 
implementation of the ICWA in the late 1970s. Part III will 
provide a broad survey of equal protection jurisprudence 
relating to federal Indian laws throughout history, illustrating 
the unique status of quasi-sovereign Indian tribes in an equal 
protection context. Next, Part IV will narrow the focus to equal 
protection as applied to the ICWA in particular and the various 
challenges the statute faces. The most recent constitutional 
challenge will be analyzed in detail in Part V with a close 
examination of the recent Fifth Circuit opinion.17 This Note will 
argue that the Fifth Circuit correctly approached the equal 
protection issue, acknowledging the unique status of Indian 
tribes and adhering to supporting precedent in federal Indian 
law. This Note will conclude that, whether under strict scrutiny 
or rational basis review, courts should uphold the 
constitutionality of the ICWA. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning 
provides a model which the United States Supreme Court 
should follow, solidifying the constitutionality of this crucial 
statute under the Equal Protection Clause. 
 
“Indian child” classification is therefore reversed, but its ruling that 
§ 1915(a)(3) and (b)(iii) violate equal protection is affirmed without a 
precedential opinion.”). The en banc majority also found the ICWA to be 
unconstitutional under the anticommandeering doctrine but this is beyond the 
scope of this Note. Id. at *8–9.     
 15. See Roxanna Asgarian, How a White Evangelical Family Could 
Dismantle Adoption Protections for Native Children, VOX (Feb. 20, 2020, 
7:30AM), https://perma.cc/9U34-484F (“Native advocates say it’s likely that 
whatever the ruling [of the Fifth Circuit], the decision will be appealed to the 
Supreme Court.”). 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 17. Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021). 
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II.  Background of the ICWA 
A.  Legislative History 
The United States Congress enacted the ICWA in 1978 as 
an attempt to “establish standards for the placement of Indian 
children in foster or adoptive homes [and] to prevent the 
breakup of Indian families.”18 Congress lamented how, for years, 
“an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were] broken 
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from 
them by nontribal public and private agencies.”19 State social 
services agencies and courts placed many of these children in 
non-Indian foster and adoptive homes.20 Other children were 
removed from their homes and sent to federal boarding 
institutions, which contributed acutely to the “destruction of 
Indian family and community life.”21 The children were often 
isolated from their families and taught by instructors who 
possessed “very little understanding and appreciation of the 
children’s native languages and traditions.”22 In 1971, the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) reported over 34,500 children 
living in its federal boarding school and dormitory facilities.23 In 
 
 18. 25 U.S.C. § 1901; see House Report, supra note 8, at 8 (stating the 
purpose of the ICWA’s federal standards to be “protect[ing] the best interests 
of Indian children” and promoting “the stability and security of Indian tribes 
and families”). 
 19. Id. § 1901(4); see House Report, supra note 8, at 9, 11; Miss. Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32–33 (1989) (characterizing the 
ICWA as stemming from rising national concern over “the consequences to 
[Indian children, families, and tribes] of abusive child welfare practices that 
resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children from their 
families and tribes through adoption or foster case placement, usually in 
non-Indian homes”). 
 20. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4). 
 21. House Report, supra note 8, at 9; see Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding 
School: The Last Acceptable Racism and the United States’ Genocide of Native 
Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 141 (2013) (describing the use of Indian 
boarding schools as “an act of genocide under international law” which was 
designed “not to educate those children but, instead, to instill in them the 
whites’ belief that everything ‘Indian’ was bad, inferior, and evil”). 
 22. B.J. JONES ET AL., THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK: A 
LEGAL GUIDE TO THE CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 2 
(A.B.A. 2d ed., 2008). 
 23. See House Report, supra note 8, at 9 (representing that over 17 
percent of the school-aged Indian population on federal reservations lived in 
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the 1950s, the government partnered with both state and 
private agencies to create the Indian Adoption Project, which 
adopted out Indian children primarily to non-Indian families to 
further the “Indian extraction” policy.24 
Congress realized that these intrusive practices by 
non-Indian actors had fomented the separation of hundreds of 
Indian families and ultimately contributed to the loss of future 
tribal members.25 An Association of American Indian Affairs 
survey in 1974 indicated that “approximately 25–35% of all 
Indian children are separated from their families and placed in 
foster homes, adoptive homes, or institutions.”26 Congress was 
particularly troubled by the reasons given for the majority of 
these removals. Non-Indian social workers based 99 percent of 
the removals on vague categories of “neglect” or “social 
deprivation” rather than any charges of physical abuse.27 
Non-Indian social workers and judges often found fault with 
commonplace Indian child-rearing behavior.28 Social workers 
 
institutions, with tribes such as the Navajo Reservation seeing 90 percent of 
their K-12 children shipped off to boarding schools). 
 24. See ELLEN SLAUGHTER, UNIV. OF DENVER RSCH. INST., INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 61 (1976), https://perma.cc/7XN8-
6LGR (PDF) (explaining the then-prevailing “Indian extraction” policy as 
seeking to reduce reservation populations, reduce boarding school costs, and 
satisfy a “large demand for Indian children on the part of Anglo parents”). 
 25. See House Report, supra note 8, at 9 (“The wholesale separation of 
Indian children from their families is perhaps the most tragic and destructive 
aspect of American Indian life today.”); 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 2 
(stating that the welfare agency’s “stealing” of children “strike[s] at the heart 
of Indian communities”) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk). 
 26. Id. at 9. The report shared disturbing details about “[t]he disparity in 
placement rates for Indians and non-Indians” throughout the country. Id. For 
example, the report stated, South Dakota had seen 40 percent of all adoptions 
over the past decade involve Indian children, although Indians made up “only 
7% of the juvenile population.” Id. In Wisconsin, the chance that an Indian 
child would be separated from their parents was nearly 1,600 percent greater 
than for a non-Indian child. Id. 
 27. See id. at 10 (explaining how many cases were argued merely on 
allegations of emotional damages inflicted on the child from living with their 
parents). 
 28. See id. (“Many social workers, untutored in the ways of Indian family 
life or assuming them to be socially irresponsible, consider[ed] leaving the 
child with persons outside the nuclear family as neglect and thus as grounds 
for terminating parental rights.”); JONES, supra note 22, at 3 (arguing that 
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regularly made decisions Congress considered “wholly 
inappropriate” in the context of Indian cultural values and 
social norms.29 
In addition to the removals themselves, Congress also 
began to question the methodology with which states placed 
children in adoptive or foster homes. Discriminatory standards, 
based on “middle-class values,” disqualified most Indian 
families from fostering or adopting Indian children.30 As a 
result, by 1969, a survey of sixteen states showed that 
approximately 85 percent of Indian children in foster homes 
were living with non-Indian families.31 Congress believed that 
many of the states actively failed to “recognize the essential 
tribal relations of Indian people and the cultural and social 
standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.”32 
The commonly accepted standard for child welfare litigation is 
 
non-Indian social workers remained ignorant of the traditional Indian ways of 
child-rearing such as leaving children with grandparents for extended periods 
of time); Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act: Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 
587, 603–04 (2002) (“[S]tate child welfare officials were insensitive to 
traditional Indian approaches to child rearing, in particular the widespread 
practice of involving members of a child’s extended family in significant 
caregiving.”). 
 29. See House Report, supra note 8, at 10 (asserting social workers’ 
conclusions regarding Indian children’s emotional risk and Indian parents’ 
caregiving abilities to be blinded by bias and a lack of respect for systemic 
cultural differences). 
 30. See id. at 11 (“Discriminatory standards have made it virtually 
impossible for most Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents, 
since they are based on middle class values.”); Atwood, supra note 28, at 
604 – 05 (“Applying majoritarian middle-class values, state workers often 
construed [Indian child-rearing] practice[s] as neglect or even abandonment. 
In addition, high rates of alcoholism and poverty were relied on as 
justifications for removing Indian children from their communities.”). 
 31. House Report, supra note 8, at 9; see Allison Krause Elder, “Indian” 
as a Political Classification: Reading the Tribe Back into the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, 13 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 417, 418 n.10 (2018) (explaining that 
the phenomenon of Indian children ending up in non-Indian homes can also 
be attributed to the Indian Adoption Project of the 1950s, as well as a 
well-known campaign “Kill the Indian, Save the Child” (citing Lila J. George, 
Why the Need for the Indian Child Welfare Act?, 5 J. MULTICULTURAL SOC. 
WORK 165 (1997))); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE 243 (2009) 
(citing one of the leading educators and spokesmen for federal boarding 
schools, William Pratt, as espousing the primary goal “to kill the Indian and 
save the man”). 
 32. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5). 
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the “best interest of the child” standard (BICS).33 The BICS 
prioritizes, above all, providing the child with the opportunity 
to psychologically bond with at least one adult “who is perceived 
by that child as his or her psychological parent.”34 Some believe 
that the ICWA, by considering not only the individual child’s 
interest but also that of the greater tribe,35 creates an inherent 
tension between tribal and individual welfare, making it 
incompatible with the BICS.36 
Others reject this notion, arguing that the ICWA instead 
merges the two interests and, in doing so, exemplifies “the gold 
standard” of child welfare by creating provisions which 
“maintain a safe environment for the child while preserving as 
many of a child’s connections as possible.”37 The ICWA embodies 
 
 33. See JONES, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that this theory was 
popularized by Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit in their well-known book Beyond 
the Best Interest of the Child); Julia Halloran McLaughlin, The Fundamental 
Truth about Best Interests, 54 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 113, 160 (2009) (“The [BICS] is 
a creature of common law, existing from time immemorial and has become the 
bedrock of our state custody statutory law. . . . At its core the [standard] is 
designed to identify and reinforce the child’s fundamental right to a loving and 
nurturing parent-like relationship.”). 
 34. JONES, supra note 22, at 12; see Brief for Casey Family Programs et 
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 5, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 
F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479) [hereinafter Casey Brief] (“Child 
welfare’s core principle is that children are best served by preserving and 
strengthening their birth family relationships.”). 
 35. House Report, supra note 8, at 8 (“The purpose of [the ICWA] is to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and 
security of Indian tribes and families . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 36. See Timothy Sandefur, Escaping the ICWA Penalty Box: In Defense of 
Equal Protection for Indian Children, 37 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 12–13 (2017) 
(arguing that the ICWA’s placement preferences override individual 
consideration of a child’s personal best interests, “except in the rarest of 
circumstances”); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Beyond the Best Interests of the Tribe: 
The Indian Child Welfare Act and the Adoption of Indian Children, 66 U. DET. 
L. REV. 451, 453 (1989) (“For the Indian children who may become involved in 
protracted controversies about their adoptive placement the ICWA goal of 
promoting their best interests may be undermined by the ICWA’s other goal 
of ensuring insuring tribal survival.”); Jones, supra note 22, at 12 (noting that 
the ICWA’s holistic, tribal goals have been perceived as straying from the “best 
interest of the child” theory). 
 37. Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 4–5 (explaining that the central 
interest in child welfare—maintaining family integrity—includes an interest 
in preserving “the mesh of ties that surround a child, from the closest ties 
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the “realization that Native Americans have unique practices 
and traditions regarding child-rearing that are not susceptible 
to judgment using a non-Indian barometer.”38 These traditions 
revolve around semi-autonomous tribal communities and 
therefore necessitate tribal considerations to be folded into an 
Indian child’s BICS analysis.39 Similarly, the ICWA’s goal of 
protecting the stability and security of Indian tribes is 
inextricably linked with the protection of Indian children.40 
Congress drafted the ICWA to promote the unique best interests 
of Indian children and tribes by addressing tribal considerations 
in child welfare proceedings and eliminating “subjective values” 
imposed by judges and state welfare officials which previously 
controlled the evaluation of Indian children’s best interests.41 To 
do so, Congress provided an objective, yet individualized, 
framework to assist decision-makers in properly evaluating the 
best interests of Indian children by taking tribal interests into 
 
(birth parents, siblings), to extended family, to the child’s broader 
community”). The placement provisions prioritize keeping children within the 
child’s birth family first, then placement with extended family (even without 
tribal connection), and finally members of the child’s broader community, 
including the child’s tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b). The role of tribal 
placements forms “a context-specific application of the universal best practice 
of preserving as many of a child’s connections to the community as possible.” 
Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 5. 
 38. JONES, supra note 22, at 12. 
 39. Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 6 (“Thus, ICWA’s interest in preserving 
a child’s ties to a tribe . . . is best understood as implementing the universal 
best practice of prioritizing placements that will maintain as many of a child’s 
networks, and as much stability and sense of identity, as possible.”); Tanya A. 
Cooper, Racial Bias in American Foster Care: The National Debate, 97 MARQ. 
L. REV. 215, 244 (2013) (“The best interests of Native American children are 
inherently tied to the concept of belonging.”). 
 40. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the 
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”); 
Jeanne Louise Carriere, Representing the Native American: Culture, 
Jurisdiction, and the Indian Child Welfare Act, 79 IOWA L. REV. 585, 602 (1994) 
(“With the disappearance of the younger generation, Native American tribes 
would lose the conduit of their cultures.”). 
 41. See House Report, supra note 8, at 15 (“Moreover, judges too may find 
it difficult, in utilizing vague standards like ‘the best interests of the child’, to 
avoid decisions resting on subjective values.”). 
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account while remaining loyal to the fundamental facets of the 
BICS.42 
B.  Provisions of the ICWA 
This carefully drafted decision-making framework includes 
both procedural and substantive provisions all designed “to 
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the 
stability and security of Indian tribes and families.”43 To protect 
these interests the ICWA sets out three primary objectives: (1) 
eliminating the removal of Indian children due to cultural bias 
and ignorance; (2) placing validly-removed Indian children in 
foster or adoptive homes that reflect their unique culture and 
background; and (3) increasing tribal court adjudication of child 
custody proceedings.44 In keeping with these objectives, the 
statute is “jurisdictionally stringent in favor of tribal court 
jurisdiction, creates minimum federal standards for the removal 
of Indian children from their homes by the state, and establishes 
strict placement preferences that must be followed by state 
courts.”45 
The ICWA applies to all state court child custody 
proceedings involving an Indian child.46 Child custody 
proceedings are defined by the statute to encompass: (1) foster 
care placements; (2) termination of parental rights; (3) 
 
 42. Casey Brief, supra note 34, at 16–17 (explaining how the statute 
“mandates structured placement preferences while permitting customized 
consideration of each child’s needs” by including a departure from placement 
preferences upon a showing of “good cause” (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b))). 
 43. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
 44. Id. § 1901; JONES, supra note 22, at 4–5. 
 45. POMMERSHEIM, supra note 31, at 243 (interpreting the statute to aim 
to accomplish these three primary objectives). 
 46. Under the ICWA, “Indian child” is defined as “any unmarried person 
who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) 
is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a 
member of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). This definition gives tribes 
ultimate power to define who is an “Indian child” based on their own 
membership criteria. See Elder, supra note 31, at 422 (“Rather than impose 
their own understanding of Indian identify, Congress chose to defer to tribal 
standards for membership eligibility. Key to the ICWA, this definitional power 
reflects Indian tribes’ status as sovereign nations, as well as the importance 
of children to tribal sovereignty.”). 
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pre-adoptive placement; and (4) adoptive placement.47 In any of 
these proceedings involving one or more Indian children, ICWA 
imposes minimum federal procedural requirements that are 
unique to Indian cases. 
First, the ICWA grants tribal courts jurisdiction over 
Indian child custody proceedings. Exclusive jurisdiction is given 
to tribal courts when the child in question is a resident or 
domiciliary of the reservation.48 If the child is not a resident or 
domiciliary of a reservation, a state court “in the absence of good 
cause to the contrary shall transfer such proceeding to the 
jurisdiction of the tribe.”49 This concurrent jurisdiction for the 
tribe can be obtained upon the petition of either of the child’s 
parents, the child’s Indian custodian,50 or the Indian child’s 
tribe.51 Furthermore, the Indian child’s tribe(s) has the right to 
intervene “at any point in the proceeding.”52 In general, the 
ICWA favors a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal courts of a child 
custody proceeding, barring any unusual findings made by the 
state court judge.53 Tribal courts may decline to take individual 
cases.54 In order to facilitate an intervention or transfer, notice 
is also a crucial requirement under the ICWA.55 In any 
involuntary child custody proceeding where a party knows or 
has reason to believe that the child involved is an Indian child, 
there is “an affirmative obligation on the part of all parties, and 
 
 47. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). 
 48. Id. § 1911(a). 
 49. Id. § 1911(b). 
 50. See id. § 1903(6) (“‘Indian custodian’ means any Indian person who 
has legal custody of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State 
law or to whom temporary physical care, custody, and control has been 
transferred by the parent of such child.”). 
 51. Id. § 1911(b). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989) 
(determining that the jurisdictional transfer provisions of the ICWA create 
“presumptive” tribal court jurisdiction). 
 54. See JONES, supra note 22, at 6 (describing how many tribes 
consciously decline transfers due to a lack of resources to provide for their 
children and a hope that the state and county agencies can provide better). 
 55. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (“[T]he party seeking the foster care 
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify 
the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s tribe, by registered mail 
with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of 
intervention.”). 
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their attorneys, to report such to the court so that notice may be 
given to the Indian child’s tribe.”56 Notice must also be given to 
the child’s parents and, if applicable, to an Indian custodian.57 
Finally, various other procedural standards appear in the ICWA 
that apply only to Indian children. These include the necessity 
of expert testimony,58 the provision of rehabilitative services,59 
and enhanced burdens of proof.60 To sustain a termination of 
parental rights, the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that certain requirements are shown.61 To involuntarily place 
an Indian child in foster care, the court must find “clear and 
convincing evidence” that allowing the child to remain in their 
parent’s custody “is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage.”62 
 
 56. JONES, supra note 22, at 5. Heated judicial debate exists amongst 
state courts on carving out an exception to the definition of “Indian child,” and 
thus avoiding triggering the ICWA, for otherwise qualified Indian children 
who have not lived with an Indian family or live with an Indian family with 
few or no ties to an Indian tribe. Id.; see, e.g., In re Baby Boy L., 103 P.3d 1099, 
1108 (Okla. 2004) (overturning precedent from a prior 1992 decision, In re 
S.C., which had adopted the “Existing Indian Family Exception,” and noting 
that the Oklahoma legislature expressly rejected the exception). 
 57. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). 
 58. Id. § 1912(f) (requiring expert testimony of a qualified expert witness 
that the child remaining in their current home is “likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage”). 
 59. Id. § 1912(d) (“[A]ctive efforts have been made to provide remedial 
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family. . . .”). In cases involving non-Indian children, merely 
“reasonable efforts” are required to preserve and reunify families after 
children have been taken into state custody. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15); 
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.086 (2019); IOWA CODE § 232.102(5)(b) (2019); MINN. 
STAT. § 260.012(a) (2019). 
 60. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). 
 61. Id. § 1912(f). In contrast, in cases involving non-Indian children, a 
termination of parental rights case necessitates only a “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden of proof. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) 
(concluding that this standard “strikes a fair balance between the rights of the 
natural parents and the State’s legitimate concerns”). 
 62. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e). In cases involving non-Indian children, states use 
lower burdens of proof for involuntary foster care placements including 
“reasonable grounds” or “probable cause.” See Sandefur, supra note 36, at 42 
(arguing that ICWA’s higher evidentiary standard fails to strike a balance 
between parental rights and children’s safety by making it harder for state 
officers to gather sufficient evidence to remove a child). 
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The ICWA also contains substantive provisions creating 
placement preferences designed to promote the placement of 
removed Indian children into homes that reflect their unique 
culture and background.63 There are placement preferences for 
both foster care64 and adoptive65 placements, and both allow 
flexibility for tribes to exercise their discretion, so long as the 
placement is the “least restrictive setting appropriate to the 
particular needs of the child.”66 This flexibility exemplifies the 
purpose of the ICWA by giving Indian tribes autonomy and 
deference in evaluating an Indian child’s best interests.67 These 
preferences create a hierarchy which state courts must ascribe 
to when placing Indian children.68 Altogether, the ICWA’s 
provisions take into account innate differences between Indian 
and non-Indian children using higher burdens of proof, unique 
placement preferences, and flexibility for tribal intervention. In 
singling out Indian children for differentiated treatment in 
these ways, however, the statute has drawn constitutional 
scrutiny from critics. 
 
 63. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (proclaiming the “most important 
substantive requirements imposed upon state courts” to be the placement 
preferences in § 1915). 
 64. See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) 
In any foster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall be 
given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement 
with (i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; (ii) a foster 
home licensed, approved, or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii) 
an Indian foster home licensed or approved by an authorized non 
Indian licensing authority; or (iv) an institution for children 
approved by an Indian tribe or operated by an Indian organization 
which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s needs. 
 65. See id. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under 
State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the 
contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) 
other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”). 
 66. Id. § 1915(c). 
 67. See Elder, supra note 31, at 423 (“The ICWA essentially presumes 
that it is in the Indian children’s best interest to be with family in their tribe, 
or with other tribal members, unless the tribe itself determines otherwise.”). 
 68. See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 31, at 244 (explaining that the 
placement preferences “are designed to facilitate placement with Indian 
families and institutions” and are “socially and culturally defined and subject 
to tribal revision” only). 
EQUITY OVER EQUALITY  425 
 
C.  Constitutional Concerns of the ICWA 
Perhaps the most controversial facet of the ICWA is the 
provision stipulating the persons to whom the act can be 
applied. The act applies to any “Indian child,” defined as “any 
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a 
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in 
an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an 
Indian tribe.”69 There is little debate over the constitutionality 
of applying the ICWA to children who are registered members 
of a federally recognized70 Indian tribe in clause (a). Clause (b) 
of this definition, however, raises constitutional questions under 
the Equal Protection Clause71 as to whether the inclusion of 
children “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe” constitutes 
an illegitimate racial classification.72 Eligibility for membership 
varies by tribe, with each tribe possessing complete autonomy 
in choosing the factors to assess.73 Race can play a large role in 
 
 69. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 70. The term “Indian tribe” is defined in the ICWA in § 1903(8) as: 
[A]ny Indian tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or 
community of Indians recognized as eligible for the services 
provided to Indians by the Secretary [of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs] because of their status as Indians, including any Alaska 
Native village as defined in section 3(c) of the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act. 
Thus, unrecognized tribes which are not eligible for federal funding or services 
cannot assert the ICWA. See id. (excluding all but those “recognized” tribes); 
see also Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible to Receive Services from 
the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 84 Fed. Reg. 1,200, 1,200 (Feb. 1, 
2019) (containing the most recent official list of 573 tribal entities recognized 
by and eligible for funding and services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs). 
This Note will use the term “tribe” as it is used under the ICWA itself in 
reference only to federally recognized Indian tribes. 
 71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 72. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 73. See Tribal Enrollment Process, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, https://
perma.cc/Y2YG-UZ2S. 
Tribal enrollment criteria are set forth in tribal constitutions, 
articles of incorporation or ordinances. The criterion varies from 
tribe to tribe, so uniform membership requirements do not exist. 
Two common requirements for membership are lineal decendency 
from someone named on the tribe’s base roll or relationship to a 
tribal member who descended from someone named on the base roll. 
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eligibility, but, depending on the tribe, is not necessarily 
determinative.74 
The Supreme Court recently weighed in on a case involving 
a child with a non-custodial biological Indian father, but avoided 
overtly addressing any of the ICWA’s potential equal protection 
concerns.75 In its second-ever interpretation of the statute,76 the 
Court in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl decided against applying 
the ICWA’s protections to non-custodial Indian fathers.77 
Although the decision hinged on whether the ICWA should 
apply to non-custodial Indian fathers,78 the 5–4 majority opinion 
repeatedly emphasized its reluctance to apply the statute where 
a child was only “3/256 Cherokee.”79 However, the case involved 
no dispute over the child’s status as an “Indian child.”80 The 
 
(A “base roll” is the original list of members as designated in a tribal 
constitution or other document specifying enrollment criteria.) 
Other conditions such as tribal blood quantum, tribal residency, or 
continued contact with the tribe are common. 
 74. See Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and the 
Demography of “Old” and “New” Native Americans in CHANGING NUMBERS, 
CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN INDIAN DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 103, 107 
(1996) (using BIA tribal enrollment data to demonstrate that “many [tribes] 
have no minimum blood quantum requirement” requiring instead “only a 
documented tribal lineage”). Thornton’s research shows that by the 
mid-twentieth century 98 out of 302 federally recognized Indian tribes had no 
blood quantum requirement—primarily those without a reservation base. Id. 
 75. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 655–56 (2013) (hinting 
at potential equal protection concerns raised by the ICWA “put[ting] certain 
vulnerable children at a great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even 
a remote one—was an Indian”). 
 76. See infra Part IV (explicating Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield, the Supreme Court’s first case interpreting the ICWA). 
 77. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 654 (rejecting the argument that ICWA 
provision § 1912(d) barred termination of biological father’s parental rights in 
the instant case). 
 78. See id. at 643 (stating that the Father was a member of the Cherokee 
Nation). 
 79. Id. at 646 (“It is undisputed that, had Baby Girl not been 3/256 
Cherokee, Biological Father would have had no right to object to her adoption 
under South Carolina law.”). The majority provided no explanation or 
rationale for the use of this specific number. Id. 
 80. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625, 635 (2012) (“[I]n January 
2010 the Cherokee Nation first identified Father as a registered member and 
determined that Baby Girl was an “Indian Child,” as defined under the 
[ICWA].”). As a baby who had not been formally enrolled, it can be assumed 
that Baby Girl was classified as an “Indian child” under § 1903(4)(b) due to (1) 
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dissent called out the majority’s rhetoric for hinting at “lurking 
constitutional problems [which] are, by [the majority’s] own 
account, irrelevant to its statutory analysis, and accordingly 
need not detain [this opinion] any longer.”81 This case 
reinvigorated the debate over the constitutionality of the ICWA 
but provided no concrete answers.82 Thus, with little guidance 
from the Supreme Court on equal protection as applied to the 
ICWA specifically, it is instructive to contextualize the ICWA 
within the Court’s broader jurisprudence on equal protection 
and federal Indian law in general. 
III.  Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law 
A.  The Doctrine of Equal Protection 
The guarantee of equal protection only appears explicitly in 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from 
making or enforcing any law which “den[ies] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”83 The 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause enumerates 
individuals’ rights under federal law, but makes no specific 
 
her eligibility for tribal membership under Cherokee law and (2) her father’s 
enrolled status as a member of the tribe. 
 81. See Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 690–91 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(chastising the majority for needlessly referencing the child’s 3/256th 
Cherokee ancestry and “do[ing] no more than creat[ing] a lingering mood of 
disapprobation of the criteria for membership adopted by the Cherokee 
nation”). 
 82. See, e.g., Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed 
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 558 (2014) 
(criticizing the Court for using “the ICWA’s statutory text as a useful life raft 
to avoid the choppy waters of ICWA’s fundamental equal protection flaws” and 
“perpetuat[ing] the legal fiction necessary to justify rational basis review of 
Indian classifications”); Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, 
Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 
336 (2015) [hereinafter Name of the Child] (characterizing the Court’s 
“ominous” references to equal protection concerns as “deliberately vague” and 
“built upon air”); Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 537, 588–92 (2014) (stating that “the majority—despite its 
brief allusion to equal protection—would itself apply no meaningful 
constitutional scrutiny to the ICWA” and that, the Court would not “seek to 
extend [its ‘colorblind’ approach to affirmative action] to the family law 
domain”). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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mention of equal protection.84 The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, however, treats the equal protection analysis of 
federal laws under the Fifth Amendment the same as that of 
state laws under the explicit Fourteenth Amendment.85 As a 
result, in the context of Indian law, where most equal protection 
concerns are raised by federal laws which affect or single out 
Indians,86 a law’s constitutionality is analyzed as if the Fifth 
Amendment itself explicitly included an equal protection 
requirement for federal laws. 
The equal protection analysis begins with the question of 
upon what basis a law has drawn a distinction to treat a certain 
class of people differently.87 Depending on the nature of the 
basis for that decision, the court applies different standards of 
review and grants varying amounts of deference to the law.88 If 
the decision is based on a non-suspect classification, such as 
politics or age, the law is usually constitutional as long as there 
exists a rational basis—a legitimate government purpose 
fulfilled by rationally related means—for the distinction.89 
Classifications based on race, however, are more suspect, and 
are evaluated under strict scrutiny and granted less deference.90 
Under strict scrutiny, the government must assert a compelling 
 
 84. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1 (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 85. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (acknowledging that 
the concepts of due process and equal protection are not mutually exclusive); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (emphasizing 
that any “untenable distinction between state and federal racial 
classifications” in equal protection cases “lacks support in our precedent, and 
undermines the fundamental principle of equal protection as a personal 
right”). 
 86. Since the country’s founding, Congress has singled out Indians in 
federal law. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Congress shall have the 
power . . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 87. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Geography of Equal Protection, 101 
MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1583–84 (2017) (describing the first step of the equal 
protection analysis). 
 88. See id. (discussing the different standards of review). 
 89. See id. (explaining the varying levels of deference afforded 
classifications). 
 90. See Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499 (“Classifications based solely upon race 
must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary to our 
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”). 
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purpose and prove that it used necessary means to achieve that 
purpose.91 
More often than not, once the court chooses to apply strict 
scrutiny in an equal protection case, the government loses and 
the classification is declared unconstitutional.92 However, there 
are a few notable cases where the government prevailed despite 
the application of strict scrutiny.93 In Grutter v. Bollinger,94 a 
prospective student challenged the University of Michigan Law 
School’s admissions policy as unconstitutionally racially 
discriminatory.95 The student alleged that her application was 
rejected because Michigan gave certain minority groups, 
including Native Americans, preferential treatment over White 
applicants.96 The Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny but 
pushed back on the concept that strict scrutiny is “strict in 
theory, fatal in fact.”97 Instead, the Court saw the standard of 
review as “designed to provide a framework for carefully 
 
 91. See Leslie, supra note 87, at 1584 (describing the government’s 
burden under strict scrutiny (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227)). 
 92. See Roy G. Jr. Spece & David Yokum, Scrutinizing Strict Scrutiny, 40 
VT. L. REV. 285, 312 (2015) (summing up the authors’ formulation of strict 
scrutiny, which interprets precedent case law as implicitly requiring the 
government to meet the burden of proof of six elements in order to prevail 
under strict scrutiny). 
 93. See generally, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 
2198 (2016). 
 94. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). In Grutter’s companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244 (2003), the Court held Michigan’s undergrad admission policy to 
be unconstitutional. 
 95. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–18 (explaining that, besides Law School 
Admission Test scores, the policy purported to take a “holistic” approach and 
consider soft variables including diversity—racial and otherwise—to fulfill the 
school’s commitment to achieving a level of diversity with the “potential to 
enrich everyone’s education”). 
 96. See id. at 317 (“Petition alleged that respondents discriminated 
against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . . [in that] the Law School use[d] race as a ‘predominant’ 
factor, giving applicants who belong[ed] to certain minority groups [preference 
over white applicants].”). 
 97. See id. at 326–27 (emphasizing that “[a]lthough all governmental 
uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it”). The 
Court acknowledged the constitutionality of race-based actions when they 
became “necessary to further a compelling governmental interest” as long as 
“the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.” Id. 
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examining the importance and the sincerity of the reasons 
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker for the use of race 
in that particular context.”98 With those principles in mind, the 
Court examined the policy and found a compelling 
governmental interest at stake, justifying the school’s use of 
race-based action.99 A central pillar of this finding relied on the 
Court’s respect for educational institutions which “occupy a 
special niche in our constitutional tradition.”100 Additionally, 
the Court gave weight to the expert studies and reports which 
demonstrated “the educational benefits that flow from student 
body diversity.”101 
The Court also found that the means chosen were 
specifically and narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose, 
satisfying the second prong of strict scrutiny.102 The holistic 
process was necessary because there was no alternative way to 
advance the goal of gaining a diverse student body.103 Further, 
the school did not use impermissible tools like quotas, but only 
considered race as a “plus” or one factor in each applicant’s 
file.104 The Court, satisfied with the school’s showing of previous 
failed attempts to increase diversity through race-neutral 
alternatives, stressed that narrow tailoring “does not require 
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”105 
Finally, the race-conscious admissions policy did not unduly 
harm individuals who were not members of the favored racial 
group.106 
 
 98. Id. at 331–32. 
 99. See id. at 328 (holding that the law school has a compelling interest 
in attaining a diverse student body). 
 100. Id. at 329. 
 101. Id. at 330. 
 102. See id. at 333–34 (noting that the narrowly tailored inquiry “must be 
calibrated to fit the distinct issues raised by the use of race to achieve student 
body diversity in public higher education”). 
 103. See id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its 
experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities 
is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.”). 
 104. See id. at 334 (emphasizing that “[t]o be narrowly tailored, a 
race-conscious admissions program cannot use a quota system”). 
 105. Se id. at 339–40 (describing failed alternatives). 
 106. See id. at 341 (“[I]n the context of its individualized inquiry into the 
possible diversity contributions of all applicants, the Law School’s 
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B.  Equal Protection and Federal Indian Law 
The varying standards of review used in equal protection 
inquiries, determined by whether a classification is race-based, 
distills many federal Indian law equal protection claims down 
to one question: whether the term “Indian” should be 
interpreted as a racial or political classification. Whether or not 
the terms “Indian” or “Indian tribes” are considered “racial” 
determines the standard of review and, often, the ultimate 
outcome of an equal protection challenge.107 In considering this 
question, it is useful to examine past equal protection challenges 
to federal Indian legislation.108 One of the seminal moments in 
Indian equal protection jurisprudence was the Morton v. 
Mancari109 decision in 1974.110 In Mancari, the Supreme Court 
unanimously upheld a state statute, which defined “Indian” in 
part based on blood, after determining the law to be rationally 
 
race-conscious admissions program does not unduly harm nonminority 
applicants.”). 
 107. See, e.g., Sandefur, supra note 36, at 60 (“Whether [ICWA’s differing 
treatment of Indian children from non-Indian children] is constitutional or not 
depends on whether it is regarded as race-based or as based on the nature of 
tribes as political units.”). Alternatively, some scholars argue that even under 
a racial classification, all federal Indian law should be reviewed with rational 
basis scrutiny. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not Strictly Racial: A 
Response to Indians as Peoples, 39 UCLA L. REV. 169, 173–74 (1991) (arguing 
for the abandonment of strict scrutiny in all Indian equal protection cases 
because of the unique obligation of the federal government to protect Indian 
culture under Article I of the United States Constitution). 
 108. See Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal 
Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2010) [hereinafter Reconciling] 
(“Although questions regarding the congruence of Indian law and equal 
protection may seem more pressing now, they have existed since the framing 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and have reappeared at key moments in its 
history.”). 
 109. 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 110. See Reconciling, supra note 108, at 1171 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court sought to use Mancari to reconcile equal protection doctrine with federal 
Indian policy and that subsequent decisions, while maintaining the doctrinal 
reconciliation, have “failed to develop its normative justification, leaving the 
doctrine vulnerable to challenge and backlash”). 
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related to the tribes’ unique political status and thus not a racial 
classification.111 
Mancari involved a provision of the Indian Reorganization 
Act of 1934 which gave preference in hiring to Indian employees 
in the BIA.112 To be eligible for preference, the individual “must 
be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a member of 
a Federally recognized tribe.”113 In order to determine the 
standard of review, the Court analyzed whether or not the 
preference constituted “invidious racial discrimination” under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.114 The Court 
focused on the “unique legal status of Indian tribes under 
federal law” and “the plenary power of Congress . . . to legislate 
on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”115 The existence 
of this “special relationship” created an “assumption of a 
‘guardian-ward’ status” between Congress and the political 
bodies of Indian tribes.116 In light of this relationship, the Court 
found that “[l]iterally every piece of legislation dealing with 
Indian tribes” singles out constituencies of tribal Indians.117 The 
Court decided that this differential treatment, derived from a 
unique historical relationship and “explicitly designed to help 
only Indians,” did not constitute racial discrimination.118 The 
 
 111. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 554 (“The preference, as applied, is granted 
to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of 
quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the 
BIA in a unique fashion.”); Reconciling, supra note 108, at 1186 (“Therefore, 
Mancari held, different treatment of Indian people by the federal government 
is not subject to the strict scrutiny reserved for racial classifications, but 
instead will be upheld if it ‘can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians.’” (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555)). 
 112. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537 (describing non-Indian appellees 
challenging the provision “such qualified Indians shall hereafter have 
preference to appointment to vacancies in any such positions” as violative of 
the Fifth Amendment). 
 113. Id. at 553. 
 114. Id. at 551. 
 115. Id. at 551– 52 (basing Congress’ plenary power in the Constitution’s 
explicit Commerce Clause and the history of treaties being used by Congress 
to “deal with” tribes). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 552. 
 118. See id. (noting that if such laws were invidious racial discrimination, 
then “an entire Title of the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively 
erased and the solemn commitment of the Government toward the Indians 
would be jeopardized”). 
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Court’s opinion contextualized the Indian Reorganization Act as 
part of a legislative history imbued with the aim of increasing 
Indian self- governance through participation in BIA 
operations.119 The preference, the opinion stated, formed part of 
a larger goal to give “Indians a greater control of their own 
destinies” and correct for past injustice and “[t]he overly 
paternalistic approach of prior years.”120 
The Court concluded that the preference did not constitute 
racial discrimination nor could even be considered a “racial” 
preference.121 The Court emphasized that the preference was 
“granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, 
as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities,” making the 
classification political, not racial, in nature.122 Thus, the Court 
applied rational basis and found that the special treatment 
could be “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique 
obligation toward the Indians.”123 The Court also looked 
favorably upon the fact that the preference applied narrowly to 
employment in the BIA124 and was “directly related to a 
legitimate, nonracially based goal.”125 In upholding the 
preference, the Mancari Court also relied upon extensive 
 
 119. See id. at 541–44 (finding the purpose of the Indian Reorganization 
Act to be “to establish machinery whereby Indian tribes would be able to 
assume a greater degree of self-government, both politically and 
economically”). 
 120. Id. at 553. 
 121. See id. at 553–54 (characterizing the preference instead as an 
employment criterion working to “further the cause of Indian self-government 
and to make the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups”). 
 122. Id. at 554. 
 123. See id. at 555. (“Here, where the preference is reasonable and 
rationally designed to further Indian self-government, we cannot say that 
Congress’ classification violates due process.”). 
 124. See id. at 554 (clarifying that the preference does not cover other 
government agencies or activities and does not serve as “a blanket exemption 
for Indians from all civil service examinations”). 
 125. See id. (noting that such a legitimate goal is “the principal 
characteristic that generally is absent from proscribed forms of racial 
discrimination”). 
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precedent which affirmed legislation that “singles out Indians 
for particular and special treatment.”126 
In the wake of the Mancari decision, federal circuit courts 
across the country have recognized “Indian tribes” as a political 
classification.127 The United States Supreme Court itself 
reaffirmed the wide scope of Mancari’s principles in all Indians 
affairs with two cases decided in the late 1970s. The first, Fisher 
v. District Court,128 involved a pre-ICWA adoption proceeding 
arising on a reservation and involving only Indian parties.129 
There, the Court concluded that state court jurisdiction over the 
adoption would interfere with the Northern Cheyenne Tribe’s 
powers of self-government, conferred upon the tribe by federal 
statute.130 Thus, pursuant to the tribal constitution, the parties 
 
 126. Id. at 555 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943) 
(federally granted tax immunity); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 
U.S. 164 (1973) (same); Simmons v. Seelatsee, 384 U.S. 209 (1966) (statutory 
definition of tribal membership, with resulting interest in trust estate); 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (tribal courts and their jurisdiction over 
reservation affairs). 
 127. See, e.g., Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924, 933–35 (9th Cir. 
2005) (relying heavily on Mancari to determine that the statute in question 
“subjects [defendant] to Navajo criminal jurisdiction not because of his race 
but because of his political status as an enrolled member of a different Indian 
tribe”); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Peabody W. Coal Co., 773 F.3d 
977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[W]here differential treatment serves to fulfill the 
federal government’s special trust obligation to the tribes as quasi-sovereign 
political entities, tribal preferences are permissibly based on political 
classifications.” (internal citations omitted)); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. 
v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1212 (5th Cir. 1991) (using Mancari’s reasoning 
to uphold a statute allowing for possession of peyote on the basis that members 
of the Indian church who used the peyote are “limited to Native American 
members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25% Native 
American ancestry”); United States v. Garrett, 122 Fed. App’x 628, 632 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (acknowledging that preferences given to Indian tribes are not 
racial but political in nature and asserting that Mancari is on point precedent 
for any cases “dealing with Native American preferences”); Kahawaiolaa v. 
Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting the notion that 
“distinctions based on Indian or tribal status can never be racial 
classifications” but acknowledging that “the recognition of Indian tribes 
remains a political, rather than racial determination”). 
 128. 424 U.S. 382 (1976). 
 129. Id. at 383. 
 130. See id. at 387–89 (determining that no congressional intent existed 
to confer jurisdiction upon state courts over adoptions by Indians on a 
reservation). 
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were required to use tribal court.131 The Court dismissed the 
notion that denying the parties access to state courts constituted 
impermissible racial discrimination on the grounds that “[t]he 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribal Court does not derive from 
the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi—sovereign 
status of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe under federal law.”132 
The opinion stated that the disparate treatment was 
justified, even if it denied an Indian plaintiff a forum to which a 
non- Indian plaintiff had access, because “it [was] intended to 
benefit the class of which [the Indian] is a member by furthering 
the congressional policy of Indian self- government.”133 The term 
“class,” used in the context of quasi- sovereignty and 
self-government, equates the term “Indian” with the status of 
being a “tribal member” in a political sense, as opposed to a 
purely racial classification.134 
A year later in United States v. Antelope,135 the Court 
assessed whether federal criminal statutes violated the Fifth 
Amendment by “subjecting individuals to federal prosecution by 
virtue of their status as Indians.”136 The Court, citing Mancari 
extensively, found the “Indian” classification to be political and 
went so far as to state that any “federal regulation of Indian 
affairs is not based upon impermissible classifications.”137 The 
Court grounded this broad statement in the undeniable history 
of Indian tribes operating as semi- sovereign communities with 
their own political institutions.138 Again, the Court underscored 
 
 131. See id. at 389 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the Tribal Court is exclusive.”). 
 132. Id. at 390. 
 133. Id. at 390– 91 (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–55 (1974)). 
 134. See Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 
443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979) (reiterating that treaties can confer enforceable 
special benefits on Indian tribes and that the “particular semisovereign and 
constitutionally recognized status of Indians” justifies special treatment 
subject to rational basis scrutiny). 
 135. 430 U.S. 641 (1977). 
 136. Id. at 642. 
 137. See id. at 646 (emphasizing that the determination of “Indian” as a 
political classification in the statute in Mancari applied more broadly to any 
type of federal regulation of Indian affairs). 
 138. See id. (“Federal regulation of Indian tribes, therefore is governance 
of once- sovereign political communities; it is not to be viewed as legislation of 
a ‘racial group consisting of Indians . . . .’” (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 (1974))).  
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the non- racial character of the term “Indian” by highlighting 
that the federal criminal statutes applied to the respondents not 
because of their race, but because of their tribal enrollment.139 
Antelope continued to distinctly separate the concept of “Indian” 
as a race from that of tribal affiliation, which, although often 
including people of the Indian race, the Court viewed as 
non-racial and political in nature.140 
In another 1976 case, Moe v. Confederated Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation,141 the Supreme Court 
rejected an equal protection challenge to a claim of tribal 
immunity from Montana tax statutes.142 There, the Court 
doubled down on its willingness to single out constituencies of 
tribal Indians “for particular or special treatment.”143 The Court 
reaffirmed statutory preferences involving Indians to be neither 
invidious nor racial in character and applied a rational basis 
test to determine merely if the statute rationally fulfilled 
“Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”144 
Further reinforcing the unique status of Indians as 
non-racial, the Supreme Court explicitly limited Mancari to 
members of federally recognized Indian tribes. In another 
seminal case, Rice v. Cayetano,145 the Court struck down a 
statute limiting voting rights to those of “native Hawaiian” 
descent.146 The State of Hawaii barred a Hawaiian citizen from 
voting for the trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) 
on the grounds that his ancestry did not qualify him under the 
 
 139. See Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646–47 (“We therefore conclude that the 
federal criminal statutes enforced here are based neither in whole nor in part 
upon impermissible racial classifications.”). 
 140. See id. at 645 (“The decisions of this Court leave no doubt that federal 
legislation with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, 
is not based upon impermissible racial classifications.”). 
 141. 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
 142. See id. at 479–80 (“We need not dwell at length on this constitutional 
argument, for assuming that the State has standing to raise it on behalf of its 
non-Indian citizens and taxpayers, we think it is foreclosed by our recent 
decision in Morton v. Mancari.” (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 
(1974))). 
 143. Moe, 425 U.S. at 480 (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 554–55). 
 144. Id. (citing Morton, 417 U.S. at 555). 
 145. 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
 146. See id. at 522 (“A State may not deny or abridge the right to vote on 
account of race, and this law does so.”). 
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statute as a “Hawaiian” or “native Hawaiian.”147 The citizen 
argued the statute was unconstitutional under the Fifteenth 
Amendment, which guarantees U.S. citizens the right to vote 
regardless of race.148 The Court rejected Hawaii’s arguments 
that the classification was not racial and held the state’s “denial 
of petitioner’s right to vote to be a clear violation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.”149   
In Rice, the Court examined the history of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and its ongoing purpose to “reaffirm the equality of 
the races.”150 In the years since the Civil War, the Court 
developed the precedent of using the Fifteenth Amendment to 
invalidate statutes which do not mention “race,” but instead use 
the term “ancestry” to “effect a transparent racial exclusion.”151 
The Court stated that ancestry was being used in the Rice 
statute as a proxy for race.152 In response, the state attempted 
to analogize native Hawaiians to members of Indian tribes 
enjoying employment preferences in Mancari.153 The Court 
noted, but did not definitively address, a fundamental 
dissimilarity between native Hawaiians and organized Indian 
tribes.154 The Court showed deep skepticism that native 
Hawaiians, as the result of a few federal laws regarding land, 
had achieved “a status like that of Indians in organized tribes” 
giving Congress “broad authority to preserve that status.”155 
 
 147. See id. at 510 (quoting the statute’s definition of “Hawaiian” as a 
descendent of the aboriginal people in Hawaii in 1778 and “native Hawaiian” 
as a descendent of “not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the 
Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778”). 
 148. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 149. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000). 
 150. Id. at 512. 
 151. See id. at 513–14 (citing Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); 
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)). 
 152. See id. at 514 (“Ancestry can be a proxy for race. It is that proxy 
here.”). 
 153. See id. at 518 (explaining how the state uses Mancari, and its theory 
of quasi-sovereign authority in the BIA, to defend its decision “to restrict 
voting for the OHA trustees, who are charged so directly with protecting the 
interests of native Hawaiians”). 
 154. See id. at 518–19 (“It is a matter of some dispute, for instance, 
whether Congress may treat the native Hawaiians as it does the Indian 
tribes. . . . We can stay far off that difficult terrain, however.”). 
 155. Id. at 518. 
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Regardless, even if native Hawaiians and Indians 
hypothetically could be legally analogized, the Court stated, 
Congress still could not constitutionally authorize a state to 
create a voting scheme that “limits the electorate for its public 
officials to a class of tribal Indians, to the exclusion of all 
non-Indian citizens.”156 The Court took pains to differentiate the 
right to vote for public officials from other scenarios where 
Congress may constitutionally enact preferential legislation 
dedicated to Indian tribes’ needs.157 
By recognizing the status of the OHA as a state agency, the 
Court also tacitly acknowledged the difference between native 
Hawaiians and Indians.158 The Court emphasized that Indian 
tribes’ uniquely political and quasi-sovereign status gives a 
governing agency such as the BIA the constitutional ability to 
apply preferential hiring treatment.159 In contrast, the Rice 
Court noted that an agency such as the OHA does not govern a 
quasi-sovereign group.160 The Court distinguished Mancari, 
emphasizing that “[a]lthough the classification [there] had a 
racial component,” the preference in Mancari was not directed 
towards a “racial group consisting of Indians but rather only to 
members of federally recognized tribes,” making it political, 
 
 156. Id. at 520. 
 157. See id. at 519 (enumerating several constitutional examples of 
Congress granting a certain constituency of tribal Indian unique treatment). 
Specifically, the Court stated that voting in tribal elections can be restricted 
only because the elections are an “internal affair of a quasi-sovereign.” Id. at 
520. The OHA elections, in contrast, “are the affair of the State of Hawaii.” Id. 
 158. See id. at 521 (“Although it is apparent that OHA has a unique 
position under state law, it is just as apparent that it remains an arm of the 
State.”). 
 159. See id. at 519–20 (“The preference, as applied, is granted to Indians 
not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal 
entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique 
fashion.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974))). 
 160. See id. at 522 (“Nonetheless, the elections for OHA trustee are 
elections of the State, not of a separate quasi-sovereign, and they are elections 
to which the Fifteenth Amendment applies.”). Other courts have underscored 
Rice’s distinction between the rights of individuals being subject to equal 
protection concerns, while the legal relationship between political entities, 
namely Indian tribes, allows for differing treatment. See Kahawaiolaa v. 
Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that “at its core, Rice 
concerned the rights of individuals, not the legal relationship between political 
entities”). 
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rather than racial, in nature.161 Without federal recognition or 
quasi-sovereignty, the native Hawaiian classification fell firmly 
in the racial category and the Court refused to uphold the 
statute.162 
These cases form a clear narrative of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to challenges to federal Indian laws. The Court’s 
decisions evince the unique status of Indians as non-racial, 
semi-autonomous actors who often receive uncommon and 
exceptional levels of deference.   
IV.  Equal Protection and the ICWA 
This Note will now examine constitutional challenges to the 
ICWA, keeping in mind the greater framework of Indian law 
equal protection jurisprudence. ICWA equal protection claims 
center around whether the statute’s definition of “Indian child” 
should be viewed as an impermissible racial classification.163 
Critics of the ICWA attempt to portray the classification as 
racial in nature,164 while supporters argue that a racial 
interpretation of the term “Indian” is inconsistent with the 
ICWA’s original purpose in protecting tribal sovereignty.165 
 
 161. See Rice, 528 U.S. at 519–20 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 533 (1974)).  
 162. See id. at 522 (“To extend Mancari to this context would be to permit 
a State, by racial classification, to fence out whole classes of its citizens from 
decisionmaking in critical state affairs. The Fifteenth Amendment forbids this 
result.”). 
 163. See Elder, supra note 31, at 420 (describing a recent equal protection 
challenge to ICWA as “depending heavily on a reading of the Act as race-based 
legislation, with the goal of achieving strict scrutiny review and crippling the 
ICWA”). 
 164. See, e.g., Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s Missed 
Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 510 (2014) 
(arguing the ICWA often acts as “a naked racial preference for those with 
Indian blood”); Sandefur, supra note 36, at 62–63 (“Eligibility for tribal 
membership universally depends on biological ancestry. It follows 
syllogistically that ICWA applies to a racial group consisting of Indians.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance 
on Minimum Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in 
the Allotment Acts and the Post-Adoptive Couple Challenges to the 
Constitutionality of ICWA, 42 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 801, 810 (2017) 
(“[C]lassifying American Indians as a ‘race’—as opposed to classifying them as 
citizens of Tribal Nations that enjoy a sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with 
 
440 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 411 (2021) 
Other than through a vague allusion to equal protection 
concerns in Baby Girl,166 the Supreme Court has addressed the 
constitutionality of the ICWA only once—in Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.167 Neither of these decisions offers 
definite conclusions on whether “Indian” is racial or political, 
but the Court’s discussion provides assistance in interpreting 
the ICWA.168 Holyfield focused on a claim challenging whether 
two Indian twins169 were “domiciled” on a reservation for 
purposes of the ICWA,170 but the case “reveals a larger debate 
about whether the ICWA is intended to protect tribes, Indian 
families, or both.”171 The majority opinion weighed the rights of 
Indian tribes heavily in assessing whether the children were 
domiciled on the reservation and thus under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of tribal court.172 After considering the ICWA’s 
legislative history, the Court emphasized that the statute’s 
purpose in protecting tribal interests corresponded with that of 
 
the federal government—finds no support in the Fourteenth Amendment, and 
as a result, [ICWA using ‘Indian’ as a criterion] in no way violate[s] equal 
protection principles.”); Elder, supra note 31, at 437 (proposing the 
classification of “Indian” as political due to the deference to the tribes’ 
definition of “Indian” and “the important tribal interest at stake in 
maintaining sovereignty, based on legislative history and the historical 
context of Indian identity in the United States”). 
 166. See supra notes 75–82 and accompanying text. 
 167. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 168. See Elder, supra note 31, at 429 (suggesting that the Court’s two 
interpretations of the ICWA in each case mirror the racial-political dichotomy 
and “highlight the difficulty of treating Indian legislation under traditional 
equal protection doctrine”). 
 169. The twins were both “Indian children” within the meaning of the 
ICWA because, at birth, they were both eligible for tribal membership and 
their parents were both enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw 
Indians. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4)(b). 
 170. See id. § 1911(a) (“An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction exclusive as 
to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who 
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such 
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal law.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 171. Elder, supra note 31, at 431. 
 172. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 44–45 (“It is clear from the very text of the 
ICWA, not to mention its legislative history and the hearings that led to 
its enactment, that Congress was concerned with the rights of Indian families 
and Indian communities vis-a-vis state authorities.”). 
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protecting the best interests of Indian children and families.173 
The Court concluded that the unique relationship of Indian 
children with their tribe necessitated that the tribal interest be 
represented in custody proceedings.174 The dissent, in contrast, 
minimized the tribal interests at play and focused primarily on 
the rights of the parents.175 The dissent characterized the 
purpose of the statute as solely to prevent unjustified removal 
of Indian children from their parents, downplaying tribal 
sovereignty as only having sway over “the domestic relations of 
tribe members.”176 Thus in this situation, where the Indian 
child’s parents consented to an adoption and wished to use state 
court, the dissent concluded that tribal jurisdiction should not 
be granted.177 
Prior to 2015, practically no ICWA cases were filed in 
federal court and the vast majority of challenges to the statute 
developed in state courts.178 Recently, however, the landscape 
 
 173. See id. at 49 (“Congress was concerned not solely about the interests 
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact on the tribes 
themselves of the large number of Indian children adopted by non-Indians.”). 
Scholars have suggested that the Court’s acknowledgement of such a deep 
tribal interest supports a more political understanding of the term “Indian.” 
See, e.g., Elder, supra note 31, at 431 (“[Tribal] emphasis is consistent with a 
broader view of the ICWA as part of a larger body of Indian regulations 
designed to protect the unique political status of tribes.”). 
 174. See Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 52 (“This relationship between Indian 
tribes and Indian children domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in 
other ethnic cultures found in the United States.” (quoting In re Adoption of 
Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969 (Utah 1982))). 
 175. See id. at 57 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Act gives Indian tribes 
certain rights, not to restrict the rights of parents of Indian children, but to 
complement and help effect them.”). The dissent emphasizes “the Act also 
reflects a recognition that allowing the tribe to defeat the parents’ deliberate 
choice of jurisdiction would be conducive neither to the best interests of the 
child nor to the stability and security of Indian tribes and families.” Id. at 60. 
 176. Id. at 58. 
 177. Scholars view this minimization of the role of the tribe to effectively 
remove the ICWA from the context of other Indian regulations designed to 
ensure self-government. See Elder, supra note 31, at 431 (noting that in this 
sense, the term “Indian” becomes “more of a racial classification, and the Act 
a remedial legislation targeted towards protecting parents with Indian 
heritage”). 
 178. See Kathryn Fort & Adrian T. Smith, Indian Child Welfare Act 
Annual Case Law Update and Commentary, 2 AM. INDIAN L.J. 32, 41 (2018) 
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has been changing.179 After the Baby Girl decision, the 
Goldwater Institute180 filed a class action lawsuit in the District 
Court of Arizona.181 The Complaint claimed that many of the 
ICWA’s key provisions were unconstitutional under the Fifth 
Amendment and portrayed the statute as racially 
discriminatory.182 The plaintiffs juxtaposed the ICWA with 
what they termed “race- neutral” child custody laws and used 
the phrase “ancestry” repeatedly to suggest the racial nature of 
the classification.183 The Complaint was later dismissed for lack 
of standing,184 and vacated as moot by the Ninth Circuit with no 
discussion of the merits.185 The National Council for Adoption 
brought a similar claim in federal court in Virginia in 2015, 
 
(suggesting recent challenges to the ICWA in federal court “represent a shift 
in litigation strategy” as federal courts rarely hear child welfare cases). For a 
discussion of state courts’ approaches to constitutional challenges to the 
ICWA, see infra notes 192–199 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Fort & Smith, supra note 178, at 41 (commenting that the recent 
set of federal ICWA cases have been brought by “a coalition of anti-Indian law 
groups” and have become “problematic” as the constitutional arguments 
proposed at the federal level are “leaking into state ICWA cases”). 
 180. The Goldwater Institute is a conservative and libertarian think tank 
in Arizona founded in 1988 by Senator Barry Goldwater. About the Goldwater 
Institute, GOLDWATER INST., https://perma.cc/3REB-Q8SX. 
 181. See Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259 (D. Ariz. July 6, 2015) 
[hereinafter Complaint]. 
 182. See id. at 21 (“The [ICWA provisions in question] create[] a separate 
set of procedures for children with Indian ancestry and all other children based 
solely on the child’s race.”). The first paragraphs of the Complaint include 
multiple allusions and citations to famous civil rights cases. Id. at 2. 
(“Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still living in the era of Plessy 
v. Ferguson . . . .”). 
 183. See id. at 21–23. For a complete analysis of the Goldwater Institute’s 
litigation approach and racial characterization of the ICWA, see Elder, supra 
note 31, at 434–37 (discussing the Complaint and how the plaintiffs are likely 
trying to build on Justice Alito’s understanding the ICWA in the Baby Girl 
case). 
 184. See A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-01259, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
38060 at *33 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017) (dismissing the Complaint for lack of 
standing). 
 185. See Carter v. Tahsuda, 743 Fed. App’x 823, 825 (9th Cir. 2018) 
(vacating the district court’s judgment dismissing for lack of standing and 
remanding with instructions to the district court to dismiss the action as 
moot), cert. denied, Carter v. Sweeney, 139 S. Ct. 3637 (2019). 
EQUITY OVER EQUALITY  443 
 
which was also eventually dismissed.186 In 2017, the Goldwater 
Institute joined in an attempt to appeal a state court case in 
California187 to first the California Supreme Court and then, 
when that failed,188 to the United States Supreme Court. The 
Goldwater Institute urged the Supreme Court to address the 
constitutionality of what the petition called “ICWA’s 
Separate-and-Substandard Legal Scheme.”189 Citing the Court’s 
use of the term “ancestor” in Baby Girl, the petition emphasized 
the potential unconstitutionality of the ICWA being “triggered 
solely by the DNA in [children’s] blood.”190 The Court denied 
certiorari.191 
Due to the ICWA’s structure as a federal law, which state 
administrative and judicial bodies must follow and enforce, the 
majority of ICWA case law exists as state court decisions.192 
Though the statute’s constitutionality has faced numerous state 
trial court challenges, very few have been successful at an 
 
 186. See Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (E.D. 
Va. 2015) (dismissing as moot). Another case, filed in Minnesota in 2015, 
challenged a state ICWA law. See Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 124308, at *14 (D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2017) (granting summary judgment 
to Defendants and dismissing the action as moot). 
 187. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Renteria v. Superior Court, No. 17-789 
(Nov. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Petition]. The case was originally brought in 
federal court but was later transferred to state court due to lack of jurisdiction. 
See Renteria v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians, No. 
2:16-cv-1685-MCE-AC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119394, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 
2, 2016) (dismissing constitutionality claim for lack of jurisdiction). 
 188. See Renteria v. Superior Court, No. S243352, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 6801, 
at *1 (Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) (denying certiorari). 
 189. See Petition, supra note 187, at 19 (“Assuming ICWA does apply as a 
statutory matter, the constitutional problems created by treating children 
differently on the basis of race are of pressing concern—and must be addressed 
by this Court.”). 
 190. Petition, supra note 187, at 23 (citing Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
570 U.S. 637, 690 (2013)). 
 191. See Renteria v. Superior Court, 138 S. Ct. 986 (2018) (denying 
certiorari). 
 192. See Fort & Smith, supra note 178, at 33 (describing how state court 
decisions often have influence beyond the state in which they are decided 
because state courts often look to “sister jurisdictions” when applying the 
statute due to it being a federal law applied across all states). 
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appellate level.193 Several state supreme courts have affirmed 
the constitutionality of the ICWA’s classifications under the 
Equal Protection Clause, including Maine,194 South Dakota,195 
and North Dakota.196 
California appellate courts disagree on the issue, with the 
Second Appellate District upholding constitutional challenges 
to the ICWA as applied to “children whose biological parents do 
not have a significant social, cultural or political relationship 
with an Indian [tribe].”197 That court again, seven years later, 
 
 193. See, e.g., S.S. v. Stephanie H., 388 P.3d 569, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) 
(rejecting the constitutional challenge), cert denied sub nom., 138 S. Ct. 380; 
In re N.B., 199 P.3d 16, 22–23 (Colo. App. 2007) (same); In re Armell, 550 
N.E.2d 1060, 1067–68 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (same); In re Application of Angus, 
655 P.2d 208, 213 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (emphasizing that the United States 
Supreme Court has “consistently rejected claims that laws that treat Indians 
as a distinct class violate equal protection”); In re Miller, 451 N.W.2d 576, 579 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (following the Oregon Court of Appeals’ reasoning in 
Angus and holding that the ICWA does not deny equal protection to 
non-Indians); In re Adoption of Child of Indian Heritage, 529 A.2d 1009, 1010 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (noting that the ICWA has been held 
constitutional), aff’d, 543 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1988); In re Guardianship of L., 291 
N.W.2d 278, 281 (S.D. 1980) (rejecting the equal protection challenge); In re 
Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 326 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (stating that the 
ICWA’s differential treatment of Indians is based not on race but on political 
status and the quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe). 
 194. See In re Marcus S., 638 A.2d 1158, 1159 (Me. 1994) (finding the 
ICWA to be constitutional and taking pains to note the special status of 
Indians “stemming from the historical relationship between the United States 
and a sovereign indigenous people”). 
 195. See In re Guardianship of L., 291 N.W.2d at 281 (stating that the 
ICWA’s preferences are based solely upon the political status of the parents 
and children and the quasi-sovereign nature of the tribe and does not 
constitute “invidious racial discrimination”). 
 196. See In re A.B., 663 N.W.2d 625, 636 (N.D. 2003) (finding the ICWA to 
be constitutional after applying the rational basis standard due to the 
“political” nature of the classifications made in the statute). 
 197. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 526 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The 
court in In re Bridget R. explained that the ICWA should not be applied to 
children who live in families without social, cultural, or political relationships 
to a federally recognized Indian tribe. Id. at 527. If such relationships did not 
exist, the court stated, the only remaining basis for applying the ICWA 
becomes, “the child’s genetic heritage—in other words, race.” Id. Other 
California appellate districts disagree with this “existing Indian family 
exception” to the ICWA. See, e.g., In re Vincent M., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321, 335 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (“There is no equal protection violation in the application 
of the ICWA’s provisions to Indian children, even where those children are not 
part of an existing Indian family.”). The heated discussion regarding the 
existing Indian family exception is beyond the scope of this Note. 
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upheld a constitutional challenge to the ICWA as applied to a 
child with “no association with the Tribe other than genetics, 
i.e., his one-quarter ‘Minnesota Chippewa blood’ from an 
enrolled bloodline of the Tribe.”198 However, commentators and 
scholars have criticized this line of decisions as imposing 
superficial requirements that Indians “prove” their Indianness 
in order to be deemed somehow worthy of the ICWA’s 
protections.199 
V.  The Current Setting 
A.  Brackeen I—The District Court Case 
The issue of equal protection under the ICWA took center 
stage in a decision by the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas in the fall of 2018. Brackeen v. 
Zinke,200 written by Judge Reed O’Connor, applied strict 
scrutiny to the statute based on a determination that the term 
“Indian” in Section 1904 was a race-based classification.201 
The plaintiffs in Brackeen I included the states of Texas, 
Louisiana, and Indiana, along with several non-Indian 
individuals attempting to adopt Indian children (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”).202 The Plaintiffs contested the constitutionality of 
the ICWA under the equal protection requirement of the Fifth 
 
 198. See In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) 
(affirming Bridget R., and emphasizing that an application of ICWA triggered 
by an Indian child’s genetic heritage, “without substantial social, cultural or 
political affiliations between the child’s family and a tribal community, is an 
application based solely . . . upon race and is subject to strict scrutiny” (citing 
In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. at 528)). 
 199. See Name of the Child, supra note 82, at 333–36 (characterizing In re 
Bridget R. as inconsistent with state and federal jurisprudence); Carole 
Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1373, 1388 (2002) (arguing that 
to insist that Indian people demonstrate a certain level of affiliation with their 
tribes imposes “non-Indian understandings of Indianness and of 
organizational belonging onto the realities of tribal members” and is a 
consequence of the continued racialization of tribal membership). 
 200. 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) [hereinafter Brackeen I]. 
 201. See id. at 534 (“Because the ICWA relies on racial classification, it 
must survive strict scrutiny.”). 
 202. See id. at 519 (identifying plaintiffs). 
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Amendment.203 The defendants included several federal 
agencies and four intervening Indian tribes—the Cherokee 
Nation, the Oneida Nation, Quinalt Indian Nation, and 
Morengo Band of Mission Indians (“Defendants”).204 The 
Defendants argued that the ICWA did not violate the equal 
protection requirement because the statute “distinguishe[d] 
children based on political categories” instead of racial.205 
The district court ultimately found “Indian” to be a racial 
classification based on its interpretation of Supreme Court 
precedent “focused on American Indians and other native 
peoples.”206 The court relied primarily on Rice and Mancari to 
unpack the differences between classifications based on race 
versus those based on tribal membership.207 The Plaintiffs 
contended that Rice controlled on the grounds that the ICWA, 
like the statute in Rice, allegedly utilized ancestry as a proxy for 
a racial classification.208 The Defendants countered that 
Mancari and Indian case law suggested that the classification 
of Indians is “based on political characteristics.”209 The court 
agreed with Plaintiffs that the classification in the ICWA 
“mirrors the impermissible racial classification in Rice”210 due 
primarily to the inclusion in the definition of any child who “is 
eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological 
child of a member of an Indian tribe.”211 The court saw this 
 
 203. See id. at 530 (enumerating Plaintiffs’ claims). Plaintiffs also moved 
for summary judgment on several other claims beyond the scope of this Note. 
They claimed that: 
[T]he ICWA and the Final Rule violate: (1) the equal protection 
requirements of the Fifth Amendment; (2) the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment; (3) the Tenth Amendment; and (4) the 
proper scope of the Indian Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs also argue 
that: (1) the Final Rule violates the Administrative Procedure Act 
(the “APA”); and (2) the ICWA violates Article I of the Constitution. 
Id. Only the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim will be analyzed in this 
Note. 
 204. See id. at 519 (identifying defendants). 
 205. Id. at 531. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See supra Part III (explicating Rice and Mancari in detail). 
 208. See Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 531 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (explaining 
the parties’ arguments). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 533. 
 211. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
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eligibility expansion as equivalent to an ancestral requirement 
analogous to the Rice statute restricting voting only to “native 
Hawaiians and those with Hawaiian ancestry.”212 The court 
interpreted Rice as mandating that such ancestral 
classifications are unconstitutional as they can be used as a 
“proxy for race.”213   
Simultaneously, the court found the ICWA’s classification 
to be “legally and factually distinguishable from the political 
classification in Mancari.”214 The court stated that the 
preference in Mancari only applied to “members of federally 
recognized tribes,” as opposed to those merely eligible for 
membership.215 The court stated that, by expanding the 
standard to children eligible for tribal membership, the ICWA 
had created a “blanket exemption for Indians”216 which the 
statute in Mancari avoided by limiting its jurisdiction to 
“members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities.”217 The court 
emphasized how Mancari’s decision was “uniquely tailored to 
that particular set of facts.”218 The court also narrowed the 
Mancari decision by pointing out that the preference there 
afforded “special treatment only to Indians living on or near 
reservations.”219 The court concluded that Mancari did not 
“announce that all arguably racial preferences involving 
 
 212. Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533 (“[The ICWA’s definition of “Indian 
child”] means one is an Indian child if the child is related to a tribal ancestor 
by blood.”). 
 213. Id. at 534. (noting how the Supreme Court in Rice stated that “racial 
discrimination is that which singles out ‘identifiable classes of 
persons . . . solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics.’” (quoting 
Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 515 (2000))). 
 214. Id. at 533. 
 215. Id. (emphasizing that the narrow Mancari definition excludes many 
individuals who are racially classified as “Indians” but are not part of a 
federally recognized tribe). 
 216. Id. (explaining how Mancari noted that a “blanket exemption for 
Indians” in a statute would “raise the difficult issue of racial preferences”). 
 217. Id. at 532. 
 218. See id. (stating that “the Indian preference statute [at issue in 
Mancari] is a specific provision applying to a very specific situation” (citing 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974))). 
 219. Id. 
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Indians are actually political preferences” but ruled narrowly in 
a distinguishable situation.220 
After determining the classification to be racial, the court 
applied strict scrutiny and analyzed whether the ICWA was 
“narrowly tailored to further a compelling government 
interest.”221 The court concluded that the Defendants failed to 
offer a compelling governmental interest for the statute.222 Next, 
the court evaluated whether the ICWA was narrowly tailored.223 
The court found the ICWA to be broader than necessary because 
it “[(1)] establishes standards that are unrelated to specific 
tribal interests224 and [(2)] applies those standards to potential 
Indian children.”225 The court stated that the ICWA’s 
preferences burden more children than necessary to accomplish 
“the [government’s] goal of ensuring children remain with their 
tribes.”226 On the basis of these conclusions, the court granted 
summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on their equal protection 
claim.227 
B.  Brackeen II—Fifth Circuit Opinion 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
heard the case on appeal in the summer of 2019. In Brackeen v. 
 
 220. Id. at 533. 
 221. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003)). 
 222. See id. at 534 (discussing how the Defendants did not “prove—or 
attempt to prove—why the ICWA survives strict scrutiny”). 
 223. Id. at 535 (evaluating if the statute is over or underinclusive by 
asking if it “covers too many—or too few—people to achieve its stated 
purpose”). 
 224. Id. (explaining that the preferences are unrelated to specific tribal 
interests because they prioritize a child’s placement with any Indian, 
regardless of whether that child is eligible for membership in that person’s 
tribe). 
 225. Id. (explaining that applying the preferences to many children who 
will never become members of any Indian tribe does not maintain the Indian 
child’s relationship with his or her tribe). 
 226. Id. at 536 (noting that the classification applies to “potential Indian 
children, including those who will never be members of their ancestral tribe, 
those who will ultimately be placed with non-tribal family members, and those 
who will be adopted by members of other tribes”). 
 227. See id. (“This blanket classification . . . fails to survive strict scrutiny 
review. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment on their Equal Protection Claim is GRANTED.”). 
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Bernhardt,228 a three-judge panel for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
the district court decision, finding the ICWA to be constitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause.229 The panel concluded that 
the ICWA’s use of the term “Indian child” serves as a political 
classification that is “rationally related to the fulfillment of 
Congress’s unique obligation toward Indians.”230 In November 
2019, the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel’s opinion and issued 
an order for a rehearing en banc.231 The court heard oral 
arguments in January 2020 and issued a divided, lengthy 
opinion on April 6, 2021.232 The en banc majority affirmed the 
panel’s finding of the “Indian child” designation to be 
constitutional on similar grounds.233  
The en banc majority began by ascertaining whether 
“Indian child” was a race-based or political classification in 
order to determine what level of scrutiny to apply.234 The court 
acknowledged the political, plenary power Congress has 
exercised over tribal relations throughout history.235 The court 
noted that legislation often gives special treatment to some 
 
 228. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 441 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 229. See id. (“[W]e REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for Plaintiffs and RENDER judgment in favor of Defendants on all 
claims.”). It should be noted that, much like in the district court, Plaintiffs 
brought several other claims that are beyond the scope of this Note. All claims, 
including the equal protection one, were rejected by the Fifth Circuit. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See generally Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 232. Brackeen v. Haaland, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at 
*7 (5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) [hereinafter Brackeen II]. The court addressed 
several issues including standing, equal protection, anticommandeering, the 
non-delegation doctrine, and Administrative Procedure Act violations. Id. at 
*7–10. Only the equal protection discussion falls within the scope of this Note. 
 233.  Id. at 221 (holding the “Indian child” designation to “not offend equal 
protection principles because [it is] based on a political classification and [is] 
rationally related to the fulfillment of Congress’s unique obligation toward 
Indians”). 
 234. See id. at *156–57 (laying out a level of scrutiny analysis revolving 
around the key question of what kind of classification terms such as “Indian 
child,” “Indian family,” and “Indian foster home” are in the ICWA). 
 235. See id. at *166–67 (classifying the historical, formal relationship 
between the U.S. government and American Indian tribes as “political, rather 
than race-based” (quoting COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 
§ 4.01[1][a] (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012)). 
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subset of tribal Indians without singling out Indians as a race.236 
The court echoed the Mancari opinion, underscoring that, “[i]f 
these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly 
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial 
discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25 
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment 
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”237 
The court unpacked Mancari and found the case controlling 
due to the special legal status of Indian tribes under federal 
law.238 In analogizing the two cases, the court disagreed with 
the district court’s narrow construction of Mancari.239 First, the 
court challenged the idea that Mancari’s “blessing of special 
treatment for Indians” is limited to laws directed at Indian 
self-government.240 Moreover, the court found the ICWA 
directly furthered tribal self-government due to the essential 
role children play in the continued existence of tribes.241 Second, 
with regard to the ICWA covering children merely eligible for 
tribal membership, the court explained that “[t]hough the 
district court made much of the fact that a child’s tribal 
eligibility generally turns on having a blood relationship with a 
tribal ancestor, this does not equate to a proxy for race . . . .”242 
The court reviewed the history of tribal recognition and its 
politicization over time.243 In this context, the court concluded, 
 
 236. See id. at *157 (“The Supreme Court’s decisions ‘leave no doubt that 
federal legislation with respect to Indian tribes . . . is not based upon 
impermissible racial classification.’” (quoting United States v. Antelope, 430 
U.S. 641, 645 (1977))). 
 237. Id. (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974)). 
 238. See id. at *158 (emphasizing Mancari’s focus on the unique plenary 
power of Congress to legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes). 
 239. See supra notes 215–219 and accompanying text (narrowing the 
applicability of Mancari because the Mancari statute applied (1) “only to 
Indians living on or near reservations” and (2) relied on “actual tribal 
membership”). 
 240. See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *161 (“Mancari—and 
its progeny—confirm that classifications relating to Indians need not be 
specifically directed at Indian self-government to be considered political 
classifications . . . .”). 
 241. See id. at *162–64 (considering Congressional findings on the 
importance of retention of Indian children to long-term tribal survival). 
 242. Id. at *166. 
 243. Id. at *167 (“Though inevitably tied in part to ancestry, tribal 
recognition and tribal sovereignty center on a group's status as a continuation 
of a historical political entity.”). 
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the ICWA is simply applied “on the basis of a child’s connection 
to a political entity based on whatever criteria that political 
entity may prescribe.”244 Additionally, the court added, 
including children eligible for membership, “embraces Indian 
children who possess a potential but not-yet-formalized 
affiliation with a current political entity—a federally recognized 
tribe.”245  
The Fifth Circuit also examined the district court’s analysis 
of Rice and rejected the district court’s conclusion that the ICWA 
presented a similar “impermissible racial classification.”246 To 
parse out the crucial differences in Rice and Mancari, the court 
first examined the Supreme Court’s reasons for determining the 
Hawaiian voting statute’s definition to be a racially based 
classification.247 The court noted that the Rice majority focused 
on the fact that native Hawaiians do not enjoy a protected status 
akin to that of members of federally recognized tribes.248 This 
overarching discrepancy between the groups, combined with the 
statute’s classification of citizens based solely on their ancestry, 
 
 244. See id. at *168–69 (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 
49, 72 n.32 (1978)). It is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit panel opinion 
highlighted the consistency of using a political classification with its decision 
in Peyote Way Church of God Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 
1991). See Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 428 (5th Cir. 2019). In both 
Peyote Way and Mancari, a court refused to find a law directed at a subgroup 
of Indians to be a race-based classification necessitating strict scrutiny. Peyote 
Way, 922 F.2d at 1212; Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550. Mancari upheld a hiring 
preference statute that applied only to individuals who were a member of a 
federal recognized tribe and had “one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.” 
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. Similarly, in Peyote Way, the Fifth Circuit used 
Mancari to uphold a statute allowing for possession of peyote on the basis that 
members of the Indian church who used the peyote are “limited to Native 
American members of federally recognized tribes who have at least 25% 
Native American ancestry . . . .” Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1212. The panel 
concluded that the ICWA’s classification similarly turns, “at least in part, on 
whether the child is eligible for membership in a federally recognized tribe.” 
Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 428.  
 245. Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *171 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (citing Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24). 
 246. Id. at *169 (quoting Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 533 (N.D. Tex. 
2018)). 
 247. See id. at *169–70 (examining the Supreme Court’s determination 
that the statute classified citizens “solely because of their ancestry”). 
 248. See id. at *171 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 522 (2000)) 
(examining the majority opinion’s rationale). 
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led the Supreme Court to conclude that the legislature’s purpose 
was to use the term “ancestry” as a proxy for race.249 
With the Supreme Court’s analysis in mind, the Fifth 
Circuit distinguished Rice from Brackeen I for several reasons. 
First, the court noted that, unlike Rice’s facts, the ICWA’s 
classification of “Indian child” would not exclude whole classes 
of a state’s citizens from decision-making in state affairs.250 
Additionally, unlike the Rice statute, the ICWA’s classification 
does not single out children solely because of their ancestry.251 
Perhaps most importantly, the Rice opinion was acutely aware 
that native Hawaiians do not enjoy the same unique protections 
as Indians under federal law.252 The voter eligibility law in Rice 
lacked the context of Congress’ lengthy history of federal 
regulation with Indian tribes, making it clearly distinguishable 
from the ICWA.253 The Fifth Circuit determined that because 
Rice was distinguishable and Mancari controlling, the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” was “a political classification subject 
to rational basis review.”254 
After determining the standard of review, the court easily 
concluded that the special treatment of Indian children under 
the ICWA can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ 
unique obligation toward the Indians, due to the statute’s stated 
purpose of protecting Indian children while promoting the 
 
 249.  See id. at *170 (noting that, in reaching this conclusion, “the Rice 
Court expressly reaffirmed Mancari’s central holding that, because 
classifications based on Indian tribal membership are ‘not directed towards a 
“racial” group consisting of “Indians,”’ but instead apply ‘only to members of 
“federally recognized” tribes,’ they are ‘political rather than racial in nature’” 
(citing Rice, 528 U.S. at 519–20)). 
 250. See id. (explaining how Rice involved voter eligibility in a state-wide 
election for a state agency and thus did not even violate equal protection but 
only the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 251. See id. at *172 (“But unlike the ancestral requirement in Rice, 
ICWA's eligibility standard simply recognizes that some Indian children have 
an imperfect or inchoate tribal membership.”) (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 515). 
 252. See id. at *171 (emphasizing how tribal members are “constituents of 
quasi-sovereign political communities”).  
 253. See id. at *171–72 (underscoring that, in drafting the ICWA, 
Congress was recognizing “the realities of tribal membership and classifying 
based on a child's status as a member or potential member of a quasi-sovereign 
political entity, regardless of his or her ethnicity”). 
 254. Id. at *172. 
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stability and security of the Indian tribes.255 The en banc 
majority also dismissed arguments that the ICWA 
impermissibly intrudes into state proceedings.256 Based on its 
finding of a political classification warranting rational basis 
review, the Fifth Circuit did not consider the viability of the 
district court’s strict scrutiny analysis.257 
C.  Analyzing the Correct Approach to Equal Protection in the 
ICWA 
This section of the Note will evaluate whether the district 
court or the Fifth Circuit correctly determined the appropriate 
standard of review by which to evaluate the ICWA. This decision 
hinges on which court correctly identified the nature of the 
classification of the term “Indian child.” Many scholars side with 
the Fifth Circuit’s conclusion on the grounds that the term 
“Indian” is a political, rather than racial category.258 On the 
other hand, critics of the ICWA agree with the district court’s 
conclusion that the classification is racial and apply strict 
scrutiny.259 As detailed below, the Fifth Circuit’s approach is the 
best approach. The term “Indian” as a political classification is 
supported by the historical and social context of the ICWA, the 
 
 255. See id. at *174–75 (reiterating the circumstances giving rise to the 
ICWA and determining “Indian child” to be a political classification which 
passes rational basis review and does not violate equal protection). 
 256.  See id. at *175–77 (arguing that any such intrusion would have “no 
bearing on whether that law is rationally linked to protecting Indian tribes[,]” 
and to hold otherwise would be to incorrectly apply a strict scrutiny standard 
to the statute). As to the other judges’ concerns about over- and 
under-inclusiveness of the ICWA, the majority reiterated that “[r]ational basis 
review tolerates overinclusive classifications, underinclusive ones, and other 
imperfect means-ends fits.” Id. at *180 (citations omitted). 
 257. See id. (omitting any discussion of whether the statute would pass 
strict scrutiny). 
 258. See, e.g., Elder, supra note 31, at 419 (arguing that the term “Indian” 
should be interpreted as a political classification due to the historical context 
of Indians in the United States and a manifest congressional intent to protect 
tribes as political units through the ICWA); see also supra Part III.B 
(explicating precedent for “Indian” as a political classification). 
 259. See Timothy Sandefur, Recent Developments in Indian Child Welfare 
Act Litigation: Moving Toward Equal Protection?, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 425, 
430–31 (2019) (applauding the Brackeen I decision and contending that the 
ICWA indeed “falls on the racial, rather than the political, side of the 
[Rice/Mancari] division”).  
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ICWA’s place within a larger body of federal Indian regulation, 
and the application of Supreme Court precedent in non-ICWA 
Indian law equal protection cases. Thus, correct application of 
precedent shows rational basis to be the proper standard of 
review for the ICWA. 
Both Brackeen opinions focus their discussion on the correct 
application of Mancari and Rice.260 Brackeen I distinguished 
Mancari based on the ICWA’s inclusion of children (1) merely 
eligible for tribal membership and (2) living off Indian 
reservations.261 Brackeen II disagreed with this narrow 
construction of Mancari and challenged both of these points in 
turn.262 As for geographic limitations, the Fifth Circuit correctly 
determined that extensive precedent supports the precept that 
federal laws can apply to Indians no matter their physical 
location.263 Such power is derived from the U.S. Constitution’s 
Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the authority “to 
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
States, and with Indian tribes.”264 As such, Mancari’s holding 
does not depend on the individuals at issue being physically on 
a reservation.265 
The tougher question for the courts, and the question at the 
heart of the constitutional issue, is whether the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” can constitutionally be extended to 
children who are not enrolled tribal members yet are eligible for 
membership and have a tribal citizen for a biological parent. The 
 
 260. See supra notes 109–126 and accompanying text (explicating Mancari 
opinion in detail); supra notes 145–162 and accompanying text (explicating 
Rice opinion in detail). 
 261. See supra notes 214–220 and accompanying text (explicating 
Brackeen I opinion). 
 262. See supra notes 237–Error! Bookmark not defined. and 
accompanying text (explicating the Brackeen II opinion’s analysis of the 
application of Mancari to the case at bar). 
 263. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938) 
(“Congress possesses the broad power of legislating for the protection of the 
Indians wherever they may be within the territory of the United States.” 
(citing United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467, 471 (1926))); Perrin v. United 
States, 232 U.S. 478, 482 (1914) (acknowledging Congress’ power to regulate 
Indians “whether on or off a reservation and whether within or without the 
limits of a state”). 
 264. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 265. Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *165–66 
(5th Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (noting that not even the preference in Mancari 
required that the Indians benefiting live on or near a reservation). 
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district court emphasized that Mancari’s statute applied a 
preference only to current members of federally recognized 
tribes.266 In contrast, the district court saw the ICWA’s 
expansive definition, including children merely eligible for 
tribal membership, as an ancestrally or race-based 
classification, different than Mancari’s political classification 
which depended on individuals actually being enrolled 
members.267 However, the tribal eligibility requirement is not a 
racial classification, based purely on ancestry or blood. 
The statute in Mancari required not only tribal 
membership, but also that an individual be at least one-quarter 
“Indian blood.”268 This blood quantum provision differs from the 
ICWA, which depends solely on the tribe’s individual criteria for 
membership and does not explicitly impose any blood quantum 
requirement.269 Therefore, the case for racial discrimination “is 
even weaker regarding the ICWA, since the legislation itself is 
silent on bloodlines.”270 If the Supreme Court went so far as to 
designate the Mancari statute, with an explicit blood quantum 
provision, a non-racial classification, then “the ICWA certainly 
is an expression of ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the 
Indians’ as tribes, rather than race-based legislation.”271 
 
 266. See Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 533 (N.D. Tex. 2018) 
(maintaining that the narrow Mancari definition excludes many individuals 
who are racially classified as “Indians” but are not part of a federally 
recognized tribe). 
 267. See id. at 533–34 (“By deferring to tribal membership eligibility 
standards based on ancestry, rather than actual tribal affiliation, the ICWA’s 
jurisdictional definition of “Indian children” uses ancestry as a proxy for race 
and therefore [receives strict scrutiny].”). 
 268. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (explaining that 
to be eligible for preference “an individual must be one-fourth or more degree 
Indian blood and be a member of a Federally-recognized tribe”). 
 269. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 270. See Elder, supra note 31, at 428 (differentiating requiring the 
individual to be the “biological child of a member of an Indian tribe” and 
requiring certain bloodlines, due to the fact that the parent is merely required 
to be a tribe member, not to meet a specified blood quantum). 
 271. Elder, supra note 31, at 429 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 
535, 555 (1974)). 
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The concept of using blood quantum is not new in the 
context of federal Indian legislation.272 However, since the early 
1970s, Congress has gone to great lengths to define “Indian” as 
a citizen of a tribe as opposed to a percentage of a blood 
quantum.273 Along with the Indian Land Consolidation Act,274 
the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Protection 
Act,275 the Indian Employment, Training and Related Services 
Act,276 and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act,277 the 
ICWA is another example of the paradigm of a new era—one 
where Congress recognizes the term “Indian” as a “political 
designation of citizenship,” as defined by each tribe, instead of 
a racial identity.278 
Undoubtably, Congress’s approach since the 1970s 
reinforces and protects a more accurate reflection of what tribes 
themselves view as the nature of their membership eligibility 
requirements.279 Like the United States, tribes often extend 
citizenship to the children of citizen parents, passing the 
parents’ “willful political relationship” with the tribe on to the 
 
 272. See Fain & Nagle, supra note 165, at 803 (revealing that, during the 
Termination Era of 1870–1950, the government enforced policies requiring a 
minimum blood quantum before federal law would recognize an individual as 
a citizen of a Tribal Nation). 
 273. See id. at 850 (providing the example of the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975 which “completed 
the shift away from using a minimum blood quantum” by defining “Indian” as 
“a person who is a member of an Indian tribe”). 
 274. 25 U.S.C. § 2201 (passed in 1983). 
 275. Id. §§ 3201–02 (passed in 1990). 
 276. Id. § 3401 (passed in 1992). 
 277. Id. § 1601(5) (passed in 1976). 
 278. Fain & Nagle, supra note 165, at 851–53; see John Robert Renner, 
The Indian Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal 
Power over Indian Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129, 141 (1992) (“[B]y the 
late 1960s the policy again shifted—with the beginning of the present period. 
The new emphasis was and remains on tribal self-determination.”). 
 279. Brief for the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in 
Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant at 14, Brackeen v. 
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Brief for Cherokee 
Indians in Oklahoma] (“Citizenship in a Tribal Nation, however, is not 
contingent on “ancestry,” but rather hinges on an individual’s contemporary 
political relationship with a sovereign nation.”). 
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next generation.280 In the present litigation, the Indian tribes 
argue that this concept of citizenship is central to determining 
that the ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” turns on whether 
a child has a political affiliation to a certain tribe.281 Tribes have 
long held themselves out as separate sovereign bodies with 
exclusive requirements for membership.282 Race can play a role 
in eligibility, but is not necessarily determinative depending on 
the tribe.283 The ICWA requires both that a child (1) be eligible 
for tribal membership, as defined by individual tribes’ laws, and 
(2) have at least one biological parent who is a member of a 
tribe.284 Factor two, the political affiliation of a biological parent 
to a tribe, is also relevant to whether the ICWA applies to a 
child.285 Thus, race or ancestry is simply one factor of the child’s 
tribal membership eligibility, which in turn is one factor of the 
child’s eligibility to be classified as an “Indian child” under the 
ICWA. Using race as a factor within a factor does not make the 
entire classification race-based, especially within the highly 
political context of Indian federal tribe citizenship.286 
By muddling the concepts of citizenship and ancestry, 
Brackeen I misunderstood tribal eligibility standards. Applying 
“ancestry” terminology also ignores entire tribes, and existing 
 
 280. See id. at 15 (stating that “just as citizenship in the United States is 
not tethered to some identifiable ‘ancestor’ who once lived in the United 
States” neither is Tribal Nation citizenship based in ancestry but is a 
consequence of a “willful political relationship”). 
 281. See Brief of Appellants Cherokee Nation, Oneida Nation, Quinault 
Indian Nation, and Morongo Band of Mission Indians at 29, Brackeen v. 
Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Brief of Tribal Nations] 
(stating the statute’s emphasis is on the child either being a citizen of a 
federally recognized tribe or having a parent who is a citizen, thus making the 
ICWA “triggered by political affiliation: enrolled membership (or eligibility for 
it) in a sovereign nation—not race— . . . .”). 
 282. See Thornton, supra note 74, at 106 (explaining that Indian tribes 
“won the right to determine their own membership” in the early twentieth 
century and now hold complete autonomy over setting tribal membership 
standards in their own tribal constitutions). 
 283. See id. at 107 (using BIA tribal enrollment data to illustrate that 
many tribes in fact have no minimum blood quantum requirement). 
 284. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 285. Id. 
 286. The Supreme Court showed its willingness to allow race to be a factor 
of a factor in the affirmative action case Fisher v. University of Texas, 136 S. 
Ct. 2198, 2206–07 (2016). 
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constituencies within certain tribes, who have no “Indian 
ancestry” whatsoever.287 Several tribes have signed treaties 
incorporating non-racially Indian groups into “the body politic 
of a Tribal Nation” and, in doing so, recognized citizenship 
rights stemming from marriage, adoption, and previously 
enslaved groups.288 With this context in mind, attributing a 
racial or ancestral definition to tribal citizenship requirements 
necessitates a disregard for U.S.-Indian history, federal statutes 
and treaties, and the very nature of tribal eligibility criteria. 
Additionally, the Mancari decision underscored the 
political nature of the term “Indian” within the context of the 
relationship of Indian tribes with Congress and the ongoing 
desire to promote Indian self-governance.289 It cannot be 
disputed that children are quite literally the future of Indian 
tribes and their removal from the community directly 
undermines any semblance of tribal autonomy.290 The ICWA, as 
a congressional response to the destruction of Indian tribes, 
embodies the type of legislation necessitated by such a 
“guardian-ward” relationship.291 Further, the ICWA directly 
promotes tribal autonomy and self-governance by granting 
 
 287. See Brief for Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, supra note 279, at 
15 – 16, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining how 
after the Civil War the United States and the historical Cherokee Nation 
signed a treaty to free all slaves in their Nation and that “all freedmen . . . and 
their descendants, shall have all the rights of native Cherokees . . . .” (quoting 
Treaty With The Cherokee, 1866, U.S.-Cherokee Nation of Indians, art. 9, July 
19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799)). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
recently confirmed that, “the 1886 treaty alone . . . guarantees for qualifying 
freedmen the right to citizenship.” Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 
86, 123 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 288. See Brief for Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma, supra note 279, at 16 – 19 
(discussing such practices in the Cherokee Nation, Choctaw Nation, 
Chickasaw Nation, Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and Seminole Nation). 
 289. See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text (explicating the 
Court’s reasoning). 
 290. See, e.g., To Establish Standards for the Placement of Indian Children 
in Foster or Adoptive Homes, to Prevent the Breakup of Indian Families, and 
for Other Purposes: Hearing on S. 1214 Before the S. Select Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 95th CONG. 1, 156 (1977) (Statement of Hon. Calvin Isaacs) (noting 
that “[r]emoval is generally accomplished without notice to or consultation 
with responsible tribal authorities”). 
 291. 123 CONG. REC. 9980 (1977) (Statement of Sen. Abourezk) (“It is the 
responsibility of the Congress to take whatever action is within its power to 
see to it that American Indian communities and their families are not 
destroyed.”). 
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tribes intervention rights in state court proceedings,292 creating 
placement preferences for Indian children,293 and, in some cases, 
allowing exclusive tribal court jurisdiction.294 Thus, Brackeen II 
correctly determined the district court’s interpretation of 
Mancari to be far too narrow.295 Instead, including children who 
are eligible for tribal membership due to their parents’ tribal 
affiliations should be seen not as a proxy for race, but rather as 
a standard which “embraces Indian children who possess a 
potential but not-yet-formalized affiliation with a [tribe.]”296 
Brackeen I also relied heavily on “precedent developed by 
the Supreme Court’s review of statutes focused on American 
Indians and other native peoples.”297 Already, this statement 
encompasses far too broad a scope, as the history of federally 
recognized Indian tribes is unique in equal protection 
jurisprudence from any other population.298 The district court 
claimed that the ICWA, by including in the definition of “Indian 
child” children merely eligible for tribal membership, “mirrors 
 
 292. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911I (enumerating tribal courts’ unprecedented 
intervention abilities in state court child custody proceedings). 
 293. See id. § 1915 (describing the deference given to tribes in Indian 
placement preferences for removed children and how tribes can even edit a 
child’s preference order via a resolution). 
 294. See id. § 1911(a) (explaining that tribal courts shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction over certain child custody proceedings involving “an Indian child 
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe”). 
 295. It warrants mention that the district court, when limiting the 
application of Mancari, heavily emphasized a line from the opinion stating 
that the BIA statute “is a specific provision applying to a very specific 
situation.” Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (citing 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)). However, this quotation is taken 
out of context and appeared in Mancari during a statutory interpretation 
discussion merely to address whether the BIA statute had been implicitly 
repealed by the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunities Act. See Morton, 417 
U.S. at 550–51 (discussing that “[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, 
a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one”). It has 
little bearing on the application of the Mancari precedent on the political 
versus racial classification question. 
 296. Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *171 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (emphasizing that minors and infants often do not have the 
capacity to initiate the formal procedure to join a tribe).  
 
 297. Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (citing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 
495 (2000)) (emphasis added). 
 298. See supra Parts II–III. 
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the impermissible racial classification in Rice.”299 However, the 
two classifications are distinguishable for several reasons. As 
the Fifth Circuit noted, unlike Rice’s statute, the ICWA 
classification does not exclude whole classes of a state’s citizens 
from participating in state affairs.300 In contrast, the ICWA 
exists to assist judges and state courts in making child custody 
decisions for children who were either members of, or were 
eligible for membership and had a parent who was a member of, 
a semi-sovereign body.301 Unlike elections, which clearly 
implicate state courts, Indian child custody matters have more 
complex interests at stake, including that of the child, the 
parents, the state, the tribe, and the United States.302 Even 
before the ICWA, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of 
state judicial systems in Indian child custody proceedings303 
within the context of a long historical tradition of Indian tribes 
being given semi-sovereign status and enjoying self-autonomy 
in the United States.304 Excluding non- native Hawaiians from 
voting in a state election outside of the context of Indian 
 
 299. Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 531. 
 300. Brackeen II, No. 18-11479, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *170 (5th 
Cir. Apr. 6, 2021) (explaining that Rice involved the sensitive topic of voter 
eligibility in a state-wide election for a state agency). 
 301. See supra Part II.B (explaining how the ICWA accounts for the 
unique nature of semi-sovereign Indian tribes and creates tribal intervention 
rules). 
 302. Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *178–79 (noting that 
while the elections in Rice were clearly state affairs, a state court adoption 
proceeding involving an Indian child was “simultaneously affairs of states, 
tribes, and Congress” (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3))). 
 303. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dist. Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (“State-court 
jurisdiction plainly would interfere with the powers of self-government 
conferred upon the [tribe] and exercised through the Tribal Court.”). 
 304. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (stating that “Congress shall have the 
power . . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes” and thus determining Indian 
tribes to be separate from the states and foreign nations); Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 5123 et seq. (allowing Indians to set 
up formal tribal councils and courts and encouraging tribal autonomy); see also 
Michalyn Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in 
Indian Affairs, 63 UCLA L. REV. 666, 670 (2016) (exploring the legal paradox 
between the Supreme Court’s simultaneous acknowledgement of the plenary 
power of Congress over Indian affairs and the endurance of a “critical core of 
inherent tribal sovereignty”). 
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jurisprudence is another matter entirely and clearly 
distinguishable.305 
The Rice opinion itself emphasized that native Hawaiians 
do not have a protected status akin to that of Indian tribes.306 
Brackeen II found that the law in Rice lacked the contextual 
history of Congress’s lengthy engagement with regulating 
Indian tribes.307 Precedent suggests that the principles of 
self-autonomy and the assumption of a “guardian-ward” status 
only apply in the context of federally recognized Indian tribes, 
not all native peoples.308 Thus, the Rice court’s holding that the 
exclusion of native Hawaiians was unconstitutional cannot 
serve as a roadmap by which to judge the constitutionality of 
the ICWA as it relates to federally recognized Indian tribes and 
their members. 
D.  An Alternative Path Forward 
Even if a court determined that the term “Indian” in the 
ICWA was indeed a suspect racial classification, the statute is 
still constitutional under strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny requires 
race-based classifications to have a compelling governmental 
purpose and use necessary and narrowly tailored means to 
achieve this purpose.309 For the ICWA, like many federal Indian 
laws, the compelling purpose stems from the government’s 
interest in fulfilling unique responsibilities to federally 
 
 305. See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *179 
(“The Rice Court's caution against fencing off a class of citizens from 
participation in state affairs thus does not apply to ICWA[.]”). 
 306. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 518 (2000) (stating that no such 
comparable status to Indian tribes exists for native Hawaiians); see also 
Kahawaiolaa v. Norton, 386 F.3d 1271, 1279 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting an equal 
protection challenge brought by native Hawaiians, who were excluded from 
the U.S. Department of the Interior’s regulatory tribal acknowledgement 
process and simultaneously concluding that the recognition of Indian tribes 
was political). 
 307. See Brackeen II, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *178 (describing the 
historical discrepancy between native Hawaiians and federally recognized 
Indian tribes). 
 308. See Part III (surveying cases which emphasize and affirm the deep 
notions of sovereignty and self-autonomy that federally recognized Indian 
tribes have been granted throughout history by federal courts). 
 309. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (discussing strict 
scrutiny review). 
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recognized tribes.310 This interest is based on the “general trust 
relationship between the United States and the Indian 
people”311 which creates obligations to Indian tribes, holding the 
government responsible “for the protection and preservation of 
Indian tribes.”312 The ICWA’s two intertwined purposes of 
protecting the best interests of Indian children and promoting 
the stability and security of Indian tribes both fall within this 
overarching trust relationship.313 Granting tribes more 
autonomy over Indian child custody proceedings and stopping 
unwarranted removals of Indian children from Indian homes 
are vital instruments to protect and stabilize the future of 
Indian tribes, thereby fulfilling the government’s guardian 
role.314 A governmental interest in better protecting Indian 
children and tribes remains compelling today, as recent studies 
show that the proportion of Indian children in foster care is still 
more than twice as high as the proportion of the general 
population.315 
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the government 
may use race-based classifications to respond to the “unhappy 
 
 310. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974) (noting that 
along with Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
Tribes” comes an obligation of trust to protect the rights and interests of 
federally recognized tribes and to promote their self-determination); McAllen 
Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar, 764 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding 
“an obligation to protect the interests of federally recognized tribes” to be 
compelling under strict scrutiny); United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 
1284–87 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he interest found compelling arises from the 
federal government’s obligations, springing from history and from the text of 
the Constitution, to federally- recognized Indian tribes.”); Gibson v. Babbitt, 
223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Government has met its 
evidentiary burden of proving that it has a compelling governmental interest 
in fulfilling its treaty obligations with federally recognized Indian tribes.”). 
 311. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (noting that this 
principle dominates federal Indian law and creates a fiduciary relationship). 
 312. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(2). 
 313. See id. § 1901; House Report, supra note 8, at 8; see also infra notes 
37–42 and accompanying text (positing that the ICWA’s purposes are 
interconnected and symbiotic). 
 314. See id. (“[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued 
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children . . . .”). 
 315. Alicia Summers & Steve Wood, Measuring Compliance with the 
Indian Child Welfare Act: An Assessment Toolkit, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & 
FAM. CT. JUDGES, 4 (Feb. 28, 2014), https://perma.cc/PJH8-CV8N (PDF) 
(stating additionally that many states, such as Minnesota, have “[Indian 
foster] care rates more than 10 times the general population rate”). 
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persistence of both the practice and the lingering effects of racial 
discrimination against minority groups in this country.”316 The 
ICWA is an overt and decisive response to racial discrimination 
and systematic bias against Indian families.317 The insensitivity 
of state courts and the social welfare systems toward the unique 
tribal Indian way of life continues today and leads to the 
detrimental treatment of Indian children in child custody 
proceedings.318   
In Grutter, a case where the Court upheld a statute under 
strict scrutiny,319 the Court emphasized its deference to “[t]he 
Law School’s educational judgment that . . . diversity is 
essential to its educational mission” in finding the admissions 
policy’s purpose to be compelling.320 The Court described 
educational institutions as “occupy[ing] a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.”321 If the history of Indian law 
jurisprudence teaches us anything, it is clear that federally 
recognized Indian tribes also occupy a unique “niche” in the 
United States’ constitutional tradition.322 In the context of 
semi-sovereign Indian tribes, courts have shown extreme 
 
 316. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) 
(dispelling the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact” 
in all circumstances); see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326–327 (2003) 
(“Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all 
are invalidated by it.”). 
 317. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 213–14 (identifying 
Euro-American cultural bias as the leading cause of distress to Indian families 
and culture, due to a legal system that was depleting tribal populations 
deliberately because of “profound prejudice and discrimination” (quoting 
statements of Evelyn Blanchard, a BIA social worker)); see also supra Part 
II.A (explaining how Congress drafted the ICWA as a direct response to the 
staggering number of child removals due to racist treatment of Indian children 
and families in state child welfare systems). 
 318. See About ICWA, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N (2020) 
(“[R]ecent research on systemic bias in the child welfare system yielded 
shocking results. Native families are four times more likely to have their 
children removed and placed in foster care than their White counterparts.”). 
 319. See supra notes 94–106 and accompanying text (explicating Grutter 
in detail). 
 320. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328. 
 321. Id. at 329. 
 322. See supra Part III.B (explicating the Court’s deferential approach to 
treatment of Indian tribes as different from non-Indians and focus on 
cultivating a unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal 
government and such tribes). 
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deference to tribes and their ability to exercise self-autonomy.323 
Each of the ICWA’s provisions directly furthers one or both of 
the statute’s compelling interests. The ICWA promotes tribal 
autonomy and self-governance by granting tribal courts both 
notice and intervention rights in certain state court 
proceedings.324 Similarly, provisions such as the placement 
preferences in § 1915 serve the larger compelling purpose of 
protecting Indian children by attempting to preserve as many of 
the child’s connections as possible within an individualized 
framework that allows for customized consideration of each 
child’s needs.325 
The drafters of the ICWA were careful to use necessary and 
narrowly tailored means to achieve these compelling purposes, 
crafting a statute with similar properties as the admissions 
policy in Grutter. Brackeen I claimed that the ICWA’s definition 
of “Indian child” was overinclusive because it encompassed all 
“children simply eligible for membership who have a biological 
Indian parent.”326 But this misstates the text of the statute, 
which applies only to children eligible for membership with a 
biological parent who is a “member of an Indian tribe.”327 The 
legislative history shows that Congress originally considered, 
but ultimately rejected, a broader definition of “Indian child.”328 
An earlier draft of the ICWA did not define “Indian child” 
specifically, but instead defined “Indian” as “any person who is 
a member of or who is eligible for membership in a federally 
recognized Indian tribe.”329 The final draft changed this 
 
 323. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 541 (1974) (finding the BIA 
statute’s purpose to be “to give Indians a greater participation in their own 
self-government”); Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 5123 et seq. 
(proclaiming an “overriding purpose” to foster “a greater degree of 
self-government, both politically and economically,” among Indian tribes). 
 324. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (enumerating tribal court intervention abilities). 
 325. See supra notes 33–42 and accompanying text (describing how the 
ICWA’s placement preferences aim to serve the BICS in a unique tribal 
context). 
 326. Brackeen I, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2018). 
 327. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 328. See Nielson v. Ketchum, 640 F.3d 1117, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the ICWA did not cover a child of Indian descent who was eligible 
for membership but whose parents were not tribal members because “the final 
draft of the statue” limited membership to those children, otherwise eligible, 
who had a parent who was a member of a tribe). 
 329. Id. at 1124 (citing 123 Cong. Rec. S37223 (1977) (emphasis added)). 
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language so as not to include children granted automatic, 
temporary membership under certain tribal laws.330 Congress 
“did not intend the ICWA to authorize this sort of 
gamesmanship,”331 and the drafters excluded this expansive 
definition of membership, carefully tailoring the law. The 
eligibility language represents a conscious effort by the drafters 
to simultaneously ensure that the ICWA is not underinclusive, 
as it seeks to protect tribal members and their young children 
who have not yet become formally enrolled members.332   
In addition to narrowly tailored language, the ICWA, like 
Grutter, uses race merely as one factor in determining whether 
a child is an “Indian child” under the ICWA.333 The ICWA 
requires both that a child be eligible for tribal membership, as 
defined by individual tribes’ laws, and have at least one 
biological parent who is a member of a tribe.334 Membership 
eligibility requirements amongst tribes vary greatly, and race 
or ancestry is not the only factor at play.335 Further, the political 
affiliation of a biological parent to a federally recognized tribe is 
also relevant to whether the ICWA applies to a child.336 
Similarly, in Grutter, the Court viewed the holistic nature of the 
admissions policy favorably, with race being a mere “plus” 
factor, instead of a definitive attribute.337 
 
 330. See, e.g., Nielson, 640 F.3d at 1123–24 (explaining that the Cherokee 
Nation Citizenship Act “purports to make newborns who are directly 
descended from Dawes enrollees temporary citizens for 240 days following 
their birth” even if the child’s parents are not members). 
 331. Id. (“[T]he Citizenship Act’s broad definition of citizenship—even if it 
was full citizenship as opposed to temporary—violates Congress’ intent.”). 
 332. House Report, supra note 8, at 17 (recognizing that extending 
protection to minors who are not yet enrolled tribal members is crucial to the 
ICWA’s interests and that Congress must “act to protect the valuable rights of 
a minor Indian who is eligible [for membership in a tribe]”). 
 333. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (“Universities can, 
however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in the 
context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”). 
 334. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 335. See supra notes 279–283 and accompanying text (explaining the 
variety of tribal eligibility standards). 
 336. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 337. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–336 (describing how the admissions policy is 
constitutional due to its use of race merely as one factor for determining law 
school admission). 
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Additionally, a court should find that all race-neutral 
alternatives were considered before the formation of the ICWA. 
In Grutter, the law school argued that the “holistic application” 
process was necessary because there was no alternative way to 
attract a diverse student body.338 Similarly, here, the legislative 
history clearly shows that the desperate plight of Indian 
children and their families gave the government little 
alternative than to create federal standards unique to Indian 
child custody proceedings.339 The standards and values used by 
state social workers for non-Indian families were not applicable 
to the Indian way of life, and caused unwarranted removal at an 
unprecedented rate.340 Current practices were deemed “wholly 
inappropriate” by Congress in the context of Indian cultural 
values and social norms.341 A carefully tailored statute, 
applicable only to tribal Indians and their offspring, was 
necessary to take into account the burgeoning “realization that 
Native Americans have unique practices and traditions 
regarding child-rearing that are not susceptible to judgment 
using a non-Indian barometer.”342 
Similarly, the enactment of the controversial placement 
preferences in § 1915 was absolutely essential in the drafting of 
the ICWA given the evidence presented to Congress. Removed 
children were often deprived of their identities as Indians, yet 
 
 338. See id. at 333 (“The Law School has determined, based on its 
experience and expertise, that a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities 
is necessary to further its compelling interest in securing the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.”). The Court was satisfied with the school’s 
record of previous failed attempts to increase diversity through race-neutral 
alternatives. See id. at 339–40 (describing failed alternatives). 
 339. See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text (describing the 
breakdown of the BICS in the context of Indian children and the need for a 
more directed approach, better able take into account cultural differences and 
tribal concerns). 
 340. See Atwood, supra note 28, at 603–04 (explaining how state welfare 
officials were insensitive to “traditional Indian approaches to child rearing” 
and based the majority of removals on vague categories of “neglect” rather 
than any concrete charges); Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 
U.S. 30, 45 (1989) (“Congress perceived the States and their courts as partly 
responsible for the problem it intended to correct.”). 
 341. See House Report, supra note 8, at 10 (asserting that social workers’ 
conclusions regarding Indian children’s emotional risk and Indian parents’ 
caregiving abilities were often blinded by bias and a lack of respect for deep 
cultural differences). 
 342. JONES, supra note 22, at 12. 
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never fully accepted into their new communities.343 The 
preference for placement with Indian families, even those 
outside the child’s tribe, serves to actively subscribe to the BICS 
in the unique context of Indian children.344 Similarly, the 
preference for placement “with other Indian families” is not 
overbroad, but instead a recognition that many tribes have deep 
historical connections, allowing placement of a child with 
members of a connected tribe to further both the ICWA’s goals 
by maintaining the child’s relationship with their own tribe.345 
Finally, the statute adheres closely to its best interest purpose 
by including the flexibility to allow a judge to override the 
preferences in the face of “good cause” for each individual 
situation.346 This flexibility, embedded in a framework of 
carefully calibrated provisions which weigh tribal, state, 
federal, and individual interests, narrowly tailors the ICWA’s 
provisions to further its compelling governmental interests. 
 
 343. See, e.g., 1974 Hearings, supra note 4, at 46 (“[Indian children raised 
in non-Indian communities] were finding that society was putting on them an 
identity which they didn’t possess and taking from them an identity that they 
did possess.”) (statement of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, psychiatrist)). Though 
cared for “by devoted and well-intentioned foster or adoptive parents” 
adolescent Indians often suffered from “ethnic confusion and a pervasive sense 
of abandonment.” Id. at 63 (statement of Dr. Carl Mindell and Dr. Alan 
Gurwitt). 
 344. See 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (asserting that keeping children within the tribe 
is not the sole interest of the ICWA, as the statute also explicitly seeks to 
promote the best interests of the children). Careful to not let tribal allegiance 
override common knowledge about best interests of children, Congress 
recognized that placing Indian children with relatives, regardless of their 
tribal connection, can frequently be in their best interest and listed “placement 
with a member of the child’s extended family” as the primary placement 
preference. Id. § 1915(a); see U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., PLACEMENT OF 
CHILDREN WITH RELATIVES 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/8SV5-HH94 (PDF) 
(finding that placement with relatives is often in the best interest of children). 
 345. See Indian Entities, supra note 2, at 1200 (showing that many tribes 
today have historical relationships and are often descended from larger 
historical bands). 
 346. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (“In any adoptive placement of an Indian child 
under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to 
the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child’s extended family; 
(2) other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.” 
(emphasis added)). 
468 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 411 (2021) 
IV.  Conclusion 
In conclusion, whether or not the classification of “Indian 
child” is seen as a racial or political classification, the ICWA 
should pass all levels of constitutional scrutiny. The Fifth 
Circuit en banc majority correctly determined the ICWA’s 
definition of “Indian child” to be a political classification which 
passes rational basis review. This reading is supported by the 
historical and social context of federal Indian regulation, the 
statutory interpretation of the ICWA itself, and the correct 
application of Supreme Court precedent. However, even if the 
statute is held to strict scrutiny review, the clearly compelling 
purpose and careful tailoring of the statute, as well as the 
inadequacy of race-neutral alternatives, demonstrate the 
unquestionable constitutionality of the ICWA. Therefore, the 
ICWA is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution and should be upheld in future 
courts as a crucial protection guaranteeing fair treatment for 
Indian children. 
 
